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Abstract
Many countries embroiled in non-religious civil conflicts have experienced a dra-
matic increase in religious competition in recent years. This study examines whether
increasing competition between religions affects violence in non-religious conflicts.
The study focuses on Colombia, a deeply Catholic country that has suffered one of
the world’s longest-running internal conflicts and, in the last few decades, has wit-
nessed an intense increase in religious competition between the Catholic Church and
new non-Catholic churches. The estimation of a dynamic treatment effect model
shows that establishing the first non-Catholic church in a municipality substantially
increases the probability of an attack by a left-wing guerrilla group. Further analy-
sis suggests that the increase in guerrilla attacks is associated with the expectation
among guerrilla groups that their membership will decline as a consequence of more
intense competition with religious groups for followers.
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1 Introduction
Domestic armed conflicts are a common feature of the modern world.1 While the ma-
jority of these conflicts are non-religious,2 most of them occur in deeply religious countries,3
where it seems plausible that the religious dimension of social structure matters. Think,
for instance, about the role that religious leaders can play in a conflict given their spiritual
leadership and influence over the communities: insofar as religious leaders can reach out
more effectively to regional and local actors, they can help build (or block) peace.4
In this paper, we empirically investigate the role of religious organizations in non-
religious conflicts. We focus on scenarios in which religious denominations that have tradi-
tionally enjoyed a monopoly or near-monopoly in the religious marketplace give ground to
other denominations.5 In these increasingly common scenarios, we study the effect of an
increase in competition for adherents between religious organizations on armed conflict.
The study focuses on Colombia, a deeply religious country with serious deficiencies in
the state’s capacity to control non-religious violence, and which in the last few decades has
also experienced an intense increase in religious competition between the Catholic Church,
which held a near-monopoly on religion for four centuries, and new evangelical Pentecostal
churches. This makes Colombia an ideal case study for such an investigation.
We estimate the effect of religious competition on armed conflict using a two-way (unit
and time) flexible fixed effects (FE) framework that compares conflict-related violence
before and after the establishment of the first non-Catholic church in a municipality to
1Our calculations using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset show that between 2000 and 2018,
there were 113 internal armed conflicts.
2See Svensson and Nilsson (2017), who classify a internal conflict as religious if there is a religious
dimension to the original disagreement as explicitly stated at the onset of the conflict by the primary
parties. They show that for conflicts between 1975 and 2015, this condition is satisfied in only 31.2% of
cases; however, the percentage is noticeably higher from 2010 to 2015.
3Our calculations using the UCDP/PRIO Dataset and the Correlates of War (COW) World Religion
Data (v1.1) show that, between 2000 and 2010, the average percentage of religious adherents in countries
that experienced at least one internal armed conflict was larger than the average percentage of religious
adherents in countries that did not experienced a internal conflict: 97.5% for the first group of countries
versus 91.7% for the second group.
4For practitioner-based evidence on the role that religious leaders have played in conflict scenarios, see
Peace Direct (2019), and see Galtung (1996) for a general perspective. For case study evidence, see Shore
(2009) and Wilson (2001) for South Africa, and Haynes (2009) for Nigeria, Cambodia and Mozambique.
For more systematic correlations between religious adherence and conflict, see Toft (2007), Basedau (2011),
Svensson (2013) and Bormann et al. (2015). For econometric evidence, previous studies have examined the
importance of various dimensions of social structure for economic development, such as (Giuliano, 2007;
Fernandez and Fogli, 2009; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009; Nunn, 2012; Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott,
2015; Cantoni, 2015), and armed conflict (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2016; Moscona et al., 2018). To our
knowledge, no study has examined the causal impact of religious competition on armed conflict.
5The religious landscapes in many countries with armed conflicts have been undergoing dramatic trans-
formations, with religions that have traditionally enjoyed a monopoly or near-monopoly giving ground to
other denominations. Our calculations using the COW World Religion Data show that for a sample of 191
countries, in the 1950s the average percentage of adherents to the most common religious denomination
was 77%, decreasing to 71% in the 1960s, 68% in the 1970s, 66% in the 1980s, 65% in the 1990s and 65%
in the 2000s.
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violence in municipalities without a non-Catholic church, or where a non-Catholic church
was established long time ago. Since Colombia is still a “strongly Catholic” country, the
establishment of the first non-Catholic church in a municipality can be interpreted as an
increase in religious competition.6
We find that religious competition substantially increases the probability of an attack
by a left-wing guerrilla group in the year a municipality’s first non-Catholic church is
established. We find ambiguous evidence for the probability of an attack by a right-wing
paramilitary group, the other main non-state armed group involved in the Colombian
conflict. As for the Colombian national army, we do not find evidence of a change the
frequency of its actions.
Several mechanisms might explain these results. We focus on the community-forming
aspect of religion: the increase in religious competition, insofar as it implies more religious
denominations competing for adherents, entails an increase in religious participation and a
decline in participation in other secular activities. Crucially, the reduction in participation
in secular activities may be due in part to a decline in collaboration with non-state armed
groups — in particular, with those whose ideology is more distinct from that of the religious
organizations. In the Colombian context, we argue that these non-state armed groups are
mostly left-wing guerrillas. Thus, the guerrilla groups, insofar as they are aware of the
negative effect of an increase in religious competition on their own recruitment efforts,
have an incentive to use violence to prevent, or stop, that loss of guerrilla recruits from
happening. We model this “collaboration-motivated violence” mechanism formally in a
Hotelling-like framework.
This mechanism is not only consistent with existing anecdotal evidence, but also with
quantitative evidence that uses data on armed groups’ forced recruitment, on a municipal-
ity’s proportion of young and middle-age adults (whose collaboration may be more valu-
able for the armed groups), and on the presence of coca crops, which are labor-intensive
to cultivate. We find evidence that the effect of religious competition on the probability
of an attack by a guerrilla group is substantially larger in municipalities that have ex-
perienced at least one case of forced recruitment, in municipalities with a traditionally
above-median share of young and middle-age adults, and in municipalities that have tra-
ditionally been coca-leaf producers. Since in these municipalities the guerrillas plausibly
expect that an increase in religious competition is more threatening (e.g. to its ability to
recruit and retain members), we can interpret these additional results as evidence in favor
of recruitment-motivated violence. Additional results that take into account the effect of
religious competition on conflict-related violence in the years that follow a municipality’s
first non-Catholic church, as well as on other outcomes, are also consistently with our
preferred collaboration-motivated violence mechanism.
We also examine the plausibility of three alternative explanations. First, ideological
differences alone might explain our main result. Even though ideology may explain part of
our results, we show that our main result is concentrated in municipalities that experience
more intense religious competition. If our results were only due to ideological differences,
6We explore robustness to focusing on municipalities where the establishment of the first non-Catholic
church leads to more intense religious competition.
3
religious competition would not be so crucial. In addition, the fact that the effect of
religious competition on the probability of an attack by right-wing paramilitaries is not
unambiguously zero makes unlikely an explanation based on ideological differences alone.
A second alternative explanation is that the increase in violence by the guerrilla groups
is only due to a specific interest of the guerrilla groups to prevent newly established non-
Catholic groups from gaining political representation. Although this explanation is con-
sistent with our preferred mechanism — and may complement it — we do not find any
evidence that suggests that the guerrilla groups are particularly concerned about political
representation. Thus, we argue that an explanation based on competition for political
representation alone is unlikely.
A third alternative explanation is that religious competition increases the predisposition
of individuals to commit crimes, which, by exhausting police resources, may weaken local
institutions, incentivizing rebel groups to take advantage of the situation by increasing
their attacks. We argue that this third alternative is also unlikely because we find no
evidence that religious competition impacts two key types of violence not directly related
to the armed conflict (homicides and robberies).
Our identification strategy mainly relies on the assumption that conditional on covari-
ates, fixed effects and municipality-year trends, the time-varying changes in municipalities
without a non-Catholic church or municipalities with a longstanding non-Catholic church
provide valid counterfactuals for the changes that would have occurred in other munici-
palities if they hadn’t experienced the arrival of a non-Catholic church. We examine the
empirical validity of this assumption in a variety of ways, which includes showing that the
presence of conflict-related violence (and related factors) prior to the establishment of the
first non-Catholic church is not correlated with this establishment, and that there is no
“effect” prior to the establishment of the first non-Catholic church.
Importantly, we explore the robustness of our main results to the presence of heteroge-
nous treatment effects and anticipatory behavior, which, as recent literature has shown,
might cause a two-way fixed effects estimator to not yield the average treatment effect (see
Abraham and Sun 2018; Goodman-Bacon 2018 and Tchuente and Windmeijer 2019). First,
we show that our main results are robust to the use of Abraham and Sun’s interaction-
weighted estimator (see Abraham and Sun, 2018). Second, we examine whether our main
results are robust to using an alternative identification framework that does not require
assuming no anticipation (Abraham and Sun’s interaction-weighted estimator needs it),
and that is not based on (other) assumptions that are specific to quasi-experimental de-
signs (such as difference-in-differences). Specifically, we follow Tchuente and Windmeijer
(2019), who recently propose an estimator for the dynamic treatment effects that mainly
relies on no selection of time-varying unobservables. We show that our main results are
robust to the use of this alternative framework and novel estimator.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it adds to the vast
conflict literature (for a review, see Blattman and Miguel, 2010) by providing new and
well-identified evidence on the relationship between religious competition and armed con-
flict. Besides the previously mentioned studies examining the relationship between various
dimensions of social structure on armed conflict (see footnote 4), this paper adds to the
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empirical research documenting the effect of religious competition on the demand for saints
(Barro and McCleary, 2017) and on the allocation of resources benefiting secular rulers
(Cantoni et al., 2018). Insofar as an increase in religious competition implies an increase
in ethnic diversity, this paper also shares similarities with the literature on the relation
between ethnic fractionalization, polarization and conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Mon-
talvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Esteban et al., 2012). Apart from the fact that ethnic
identity may include categories besides religion (Chandra, 2006), as ethnic diversity is en-
dogenous, establishing causality among these relationships is difficult. To our knowledge,
this paper offers the first estimate of a causal effect of religious competition on armed
conflict.
Our empirical evidence comes from a single country, Colombia. Therefore, we use
caution in making claims about external validity. Nevertheless, we believe that the mecha-
nisms and empirical evidence presented in this paper can be generalized to other countries.
In particular, other countries with non-religious internal armed conflicts may also expe-
rience an increase in conflict-related violence from non-state armed actors when more
religious denominations start competing for adherents and where it is reasonable to think
that religious leaders have spiritual leadership and influence over their communities.7
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of the
Colombian armed conflict and the evolution of the country’s religious identity. Section 3
presents a simple model that outlines the possible effect of religious competition on armed
conflicts. The data and empirical strategy are discussed in Section 4. The main results
are presented in Section 5. Alternative explanatory mechanisms are considered in Section
6. Section 7 explores robustness, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Background
In this section, we provide a brief historical overview of the armed conflict and of the
evolution of Colombia’s religious identity over the last two decades.
2.1 Colombian armed conflict
Colombia has suffered one of the world’s longest-running internal conflicts. The con-
flict has its roots in struggles for land rights and ownership, political exclusion, and weak
institutions (Sanchez, 2001). Its persistence has been explained as the result of interna-
tional influences and drug trafficking (Deas, 2015), as well as the decentralization of local
politics and public spending (Sanchez and Palau, 2006). The start of the conflict coincided
with the founding of the FARC, Colombia’s largest and best-equipped rebel group, which
7Guatemala and El Salvador are two examples of deeply religious countries that also suffered non-
religious civil conflicts, where religious identities have changed significantly, and in which religious leaders
played a key role in promoting (or blocking) peace (see Klaiber, 1998, chs. 9 and 11). Other examples
include the civil wars in Mozambique and Sierra Leone, where religious organizations seem to have played
a key role as mediators between the parties engaged in the conflicts (see Perchoc, 2016).
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originally comprised militant communists and peasant self-defense groups. The FARC’s
main stated aim always has been to redistribute land to the poor.
In addition to the FARC, other armed groups have participated in Colombia’s con-
flict, including smaller left-wing insurgents, and several right-wing paramilitary groups.
The most important left-wing insurgent other than the FARC is the National Liberation
Army (ELN), which initially consisted of students, Catholic radicals inspired by the liber-
ation theology movement, and left-wing intellectuals who hoped to replicate Fidel Castro’s
communist revolution.8
As for the paramilitary groups, some authors have associated their origin with local
elites and drug cartels that faced threats of kidnapping and extortion from the guerrillas
and felt betrayed by the central government’s favorable view of political competition,
agrarian reforms and peace talks (Romero, 2005; Gutierrez and Baron, 2005; Lopez, 2010).
In 1997, paramilitary factions formed a national coalition called the United Self-Defense
Groups of Colombia (AUC). Its creation considerably increased the effectiveness of the
paramilitaries.
In 2002, with the arrival of a new president who eventually offered de-facto amnesty
to paramilitaries, the level of violence began to decline, and by the end of the 2000s, the
severity of the conflict decreased significantly. In July 2016, the Colombian government
and the FARC signed a historic peace deal, which earned then-Colombian President Juan
Manuel Santos the 2016 Nobel Peace Prize.
Colombia’s armed conflict has included extraordinary levels of human rights abuses,
with civilians by far the principal victims.9 Civilians have routinely been the victims
of kidnappings, forced displacement and targeted assassinations. Civilians died in two
primary ways: intentional, targeted killings, in which an armed group enters a village
and executes one or several pre-selected inhabitants, and unintended deaths resulting from
another action.
2.2 Colombian marketplace for religion
In the last few decades, while suffering from an intense armed conflict, Colombia also
experienced a dramatic change to its religious landscape. The Catholic monopoly that
prevailed for four centuries — which was strongly protected by state-enforced barriers to
entry — started to decline, as Protestant groups made significant inroads. From 1950 to
1970, the percentage of Colombians who identified as Catholic oscillated between 91% and
95%. It had fallen to 79% by 2014 (see Pew Research Center, 2014, p. 27). The fall in
Catholic church memberships was accompanied by a stark rise in Protestant ones: in 2014,
8Even though several former leaders of the ELN were priests from the Catholic church, there has
never been a close relationship or alliance between the Catholic church and the ELN. On the contrary,
the Colombian Catholic church harshly criticized those priests who took up arms and joined the ELN
(Gonzalez, 2005, pp. 34-35), and has always supported governmental structures and the priorities of elites
(LaRosa, 2000, p. 258).
9The best estimates show that the conflict claimed at least 220,000 lives, and civilians accounted for
about 81% of this number (see GMH, 2013a, pp. 31-32).
6
when adherence to Catholicism fell by a net of 13 percentage points,10 Protestantism rose
by 8 percentage points. With some small differences, particularly regarding timing, this
pattern has been seen throughout all of Latin America (see Pew Research Center, 2014;
Somma et al., 2017).
Importantly, the religious shift in Colombia coincided with a dramatic rise in the es-
tablishment of municipalities’ first non-Catholic church.11 Figure II plots the evolution of
the proportion of municipalities with at least one non-Catholic church from 1996 to 2017.
The figure shows a stark rise, which is consistent with the changes in religious adherence.12
Pentecostals are the fastest-growing Protestant group. In 2014, at least 56% of Colom-
bian Protestants either said they belong to a church that is part of a Pentecostal de-
nomination or personally identify as a Pentecostal Christian (see Pew Research Center,
2014, p. 62). Among the factors that may have favored the success of Pentecostalism
in Colombia, scholars have mentioned i) the urban transition, ii) the new needs of the
population for hope that results from the difficulties associated to the urban transition,
iii) the poor response to this phenomenon by the Catholic Church, and iv) the greater
efficiency of Pentecostal organizations in this regard (see Bastian, 2005; Beltra´n, 2013).13
The greater efficiency of Pentecostal groups in responding appropriately to the demands
and needs of the population has been explained by their charismatic authority, their flex-
ibility, and the strategic use of marketing and mass media (see Bastian, 2005; Beltra´n,
2013). In addition, Colombian Pentecostal groups have been characterized as ideologically
heterogeneous, fragmented, and economically weak (see Beltra´n, 2013, p. 140), with the
majority of them having emerged from the initiative of religious leaders who decided to
found their own church (see Tejeiro, 2010, p. 19).
2.3 Religious competition and armed conflict
To the extent that religious competition increased across the entire country, it is rea-
sonable to consider its consequences in regions where armed groups operated. Scholars
have noted the efforts of religious leaders — Catholic and non-Catholic — to identify as
“apolitical.” In practice, that has meant avoiding expressions that could be interpreted as
sympathy or support for any of the armed actors (see Beltra´n, 2013, p. 195).14 However,
and importantly, most religious bodies unconditionally accepted the authority of the of-
ficial government — including that of local elites — which led those bodies to explicitly
discourage the extralegal and violent activities promoted by armed groups. Two examples
10Net gains and losses are defined as the difference between the percentage of the population in each
country that was raised in a religious group and the percentage currently in that group (see Pew Research
Center, 2014, p. 33).
11This is defined as the first time a non-Catholic church becomes a legal entity or “legal person.” This
data will be described in detail in Section 4.1.
12Figure A1 in the Appendix (A.4) shows that this phenomenon occurred all over the country.
13In our empirical analysis, we find evidence that supports this explanation but only in municipalities
with less political competition (see footnote 51 in Section 7 and Table A1 in the Appendix (A.3)).
14According to the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), “most religious
groups reported that due to threats from guerrillas and other illegal armed groups, many religious author-
ities were forced to refrain from publicly discussing the internal conflict” USCIRF (2005).
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are the recruitment of young people as soldiers and the participation in coca cultivation:
rich anecdotal evidence suggests that religious groups campaigned repeatedly and explicitly
against these activities (see Beltra´n (2013, p. 196) and USCIRF (2009, 2010, 2011)).
The fact that religious movements discouraged the crimes promoted by armed groups
appears to have been seen by these groups — particularly the FARC — as not only an
obstacle to their insurgency, but as competition and, importantly, as a military target
(see Beltra´n (2013, p. 196) and Revista Semana (2005)). In this respect, Beltra´n (2013)
reports that insurgent groups usually saw the evangelical ministers newly established in
a municipality as i) exploiters of the population, enriching themselves personally from
members’ contributions to the church; and ii) an obstacle to the work of insurgency, insofar
as those ministers opposed socialism (see Beltra´n, 2013, p. 196). The US Commission
on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) reports that the armed groups “generally
targeted religious leaders and practitioners for political or financial rather than religious
reasons,” and that “nearly all killings of priests by terrorist groups could be attributed to
leftist guerrillas, particularly the FARC” and that “the FARC is responsible for 90 percent
of the murders of Protestant religious leaders” (USCIRF, 2005).
3 Theory
In this section, we formally analyze the effects of religious competition on armed con-
flict. Based on the anecdotal evidence mentioned in the previous section, we propose that
religious competition affects armed conflict in two different but related ways: motivating
an armed group’s members and collaborators to abandon it or reduce their support, and
providing the armed group with incentives to use greater violence to prevent a potential
fall in its membership and support.15 Our analysis uses the framework developed in Barros
and Garoupa (2002), where individuals form communities around churches, each of which
chooses a level of religious strictness in a linear space,16 and provides a local public good.
We focus on how religious competition affects participation in non-religious groups, and
add the possibility that there is an armed group that uses violence to prevent potential
losses if it expects to be negatively affected by religious competition.
Consider a society in which each member, x, has a preferred level of religious strictness
that takes a value from zero to one.17 Let x denote individual x’s preferred level of
strictness. A value of zero (minimal strictness) is interpreted as the individual aligning
with a non-religious group, whereas a value of one represents a very religious individual
(in our model, this person would align with the Catholic Church). Since members (or
15In Section 6, we examine other mechanisms for how religious competition may affect armed conflict.
We will argue that although those alternatives are possible, the evidence appears to be more consistent
with the model proposed in this section.
16That the strictness space is linear can be easily generalized to a circle model, with individuals and
churches located along the circumference of a circle.
17As will be mentioned below, since what matters in our model is the contributions of members to the
organization they belong to, the most preferred level of religious strictness of an individual can also be
interpreted as that individual’s willingness to actively collaborate with their chosen church.
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collaborators) of armed groups do not actively participate in the religious activities of
a church (nor do they provide financial contributions), these individuals are plausibly
among those we classify as belonging to a non-religious group; to simplify the exposition,
we assume that all of them belong to the most powerful armed group, which we denote
using F .18
Individuals’ preferences for religious strictness are uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. An
individual with an ideal strictness of x, affiliated with church C that has a strictness of c,
has a utility function of ux = 1−|x−c|, where 1 is the utility that the individual gets from
consuming a “religious” local public good. Each church chooses a strictness to maximize
its objective function, which is the sum of the contributions from its members. We assume
that each contribution is a linear function of each member’s satisfaction, so each church’s
objective function can be understood as the sum of the welfare of its members.
We consider two scenarios. First, one in which the religious market is served by a
single church, A, with strictness a. This could represent a church that is protected from
competition by the state. As previously mentioned, this is consistent with the virtual
monopoly of the Catholic Church in Colombia before the ’90s. In the second scenario,
there are two churches, A and B, with a strictness of a and b, respectively. B could
represent an evangelical Protestant church, which describes the great majority of non-
Catholic churches in Colombia in the period we examine. Without loss of generality, we
assume that a < b, so only A and F will compete for members — given that F ’s strictness
is fixed at zero.
Importantly, we assume that recruiting new members or contributors from F is costly
to A. Specifically, we assume that through violence, the armed group reduces by a fraction
β ∈ (0, 1) the revenue that A gets from persuading some members of F to reduce their col-
laboration to the armed group and collaborate more with A.19 F uses violence to deter the
leaders of a church from trying to recruit the armed groups’s members and collaborators.20
Note that conflict-related violence occurs only if F expects that there are people willing
to reduce their collaboration with F and collaborate more with A as a consequence of the
introduction of religious competition. We examine whether, in equilibrium, this happens.
Let fm denote the equilibrium proportion of people collaborating with the armed group
when the religious market is served by a monopoly A. Let f c be the (Nash) equilibrium
proportion of people collaborating with the armed group when there are two churches that
compete in the religious marketplace. And let ∆f ≡ fm − f c denote the proportion of
people that, in equilibrium, are willing to reduce their collaboration with the armed group
and collaborate more with the church. In the Appendix (A.1) we show that fm = 1/5 and
18As previously mentioned, in Colombia, this group is plausibly the FARC. This approach abstracts
from a scenario in which there are multiple armed groups, with competition between these groups for
recruitment.
19That only church A can recruit contributors from F (and bear the costs of this action) is also without
loss of generality; as previously mentioned, if instead we had assumed a circular space, this assumption
would not be necessary.
20Even though F ’s action is not explicitly modeled, and it is assumed to be exogenous, this is consistent
with a scenario in which in an earlier stage, F decided whether or not to use violence, and that the decision
only depends on whether F expects that there are people willing to abandon F to join A.
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f c = 7β/(9 + 15β), with which
∆f =
9− 20β
5(9 + 15β)
(1)
Note from (1) that there is a unique level of conflict-related violence equal to 9/20, such
that ∆f ≥ 0 for all β ≤ 9/20. This means that if the cost to A of violence done to A
is sufficiently small, religious competition decreases collaboration with F and increases
collaboration with A, and this means that conflict-related violence occurs. Note that for
β = 9/20, there is a positive level of conflict violence such that ∆f = 0, i.e. F successfully
prevents a decrease to its support. Figure I illustrates this scenario.
Figure I
0 am
∆fF c
fmf c ac bc 1
Fm
The intuition for this result is as follows. Religious competition, insofar as it forces
churches to compete with each other for adherents, motivates churches to compensate for
possible losses by trying to recruit new adherents from the armed group’s collaborators.
However, this can be costly for the churches, because an expected higher proportion of
people willing to reduce their collaboration with the armed group and adhere to the church
implies an increase in the chance that the armed group uses violence to reduce its expected
loss of support. In equilibrium, religious competition is expected to increase conflict-related
violence if the cost that violence imposes on the churches is sufficiently low.
This result constitutes the main empirical prediction of the model: the introduction
of religious competition will coincide with a higher probability of conflict-related violence
when the armed group expects a drop in support to arise from the religious fracture.
4 Data and Empirical Strategy
4.1 Data
Our primary data observes the establishment of the first non-Catholic church in a
municipality and conflict-related violence. The church establishment data comes from
the Public Registry of Religious Organizations,21 provided by the Colombian Ministry of
the Interior. It records the time and place at which a non-Catholic church gains legal
“personhood.” In Colombia, non-Catholic churches must apply for legal status,22 and it
21In Spanish, it is called the Registro Pu´blico de Entidades Religiosas. This data
can be accessed at https://asuntosreligiosos.mininterior.gov.co/mision/asuntos-religiosos/
registro-publico-de-entidades-religiosas.
22The Catholic church already has legal status.
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takes at least 60 working days to receive a response from the government. The request is
usually granted.23 Legal personhood allows a church to sign any contract (e.g. open bank
accounts, hire employees, pay the leaders of the organization, buy properties, qualify for
tax incentives) and to collect contributions from its members.24 This data is available for
each year from 1995 to 2017, and includes the date that the church gained legal status and
the primary municipality in which this church is active.25
The data on civil war violence comes from the Conflict Analysis Resource Center
(CERAC), which includes information about violent episodes in almost all Colombian
municipalities from 1988 onwards. CERAC is a private research organization specializing
in data-intensive studies of conflict and criminal violence. The CERAC data use media re-
ports from major newspapers, and cross-check events with other official sources, including
data from the National Police and reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty Inter-
national.26 The CERAC data focuses on attacks and clashes between groups, including
information about unilateral actions such as incursions into villages where civilians were
intentionally killed, but without distinguishing them from events such as the bombing of
pipelines, bridges and other infrastructure, the destruction of police stations or military
bases, and ambushes of military convoys.27
We explore robustness to the use of data from Colombia’s National Centre for His-
torical Memory (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histo´rica, NCHM), a national and public
entity created to produce a historical account of the armed conflict.28 The NCHM data
covers several types of conflict-related violence, focuses on civilian victims, and includes the
number of killings, with which we can estimate effects on rates. However, given that the
NCHM data on killings’ perpetrators is very imprecise, and that its observations have not
been systematically cross-checked against other sources, we prefer the CERAC database,
and use the GMH database only to check robustness.
Other controls include the number of Catholic churches in each municipality (which
23See https://asuntosreligiosos.mininterior.gov.co/sites/default/files/cartilla_2016_
-_directrices_juridicas_participacion_sector_religioso.pdf.
24See Ley 133 de 1994 y Decretos Reglamentarios 1319 de 1998, 782 de 1995 y 505 de 2003.
25Once a church becomes a legal entity, its activity may be legally extended to the entire country (see
Ley 133 de 1994 y Decretos Reglamentarios 1319 de 1998, 782 de 1995 y 505 de 2003). Note that this
could bias our measure of religious competition, since a church that is the first to obtain legal personhood
in a municipality may not be the first church in operation, as another church in the same municipality
may have obtained its legal personhood elsewhere. Thus, we should be cautious when interpreting our
estimates, as they may be biased toward zero. However, if Colombian non-Catholic churches are very
fragmented, and if the majority of these churches result from the initiative of religious leaders who decide
to found their own church (as argued by Beltra´n 2013, p. 140 and Tejeiro 2010, p. 19), then we do not
expect this to happen very often. In addition, we explore robustness of our estimations to heterogenous
treatment effects (across cohorts), which may account for some of this bias.
26For more information about the collection procedure, see Restrepo et al. (2004); see also Dube and
Vargas (2013), who extensively use this data.
27Unfortunately, data that is publicly available only includes dummy variables for the occurrence of an
event, and ends in 2009. More complete data that includes the number of events is only available until
2004. Due to these limitations, in our main results we focus on the probability of a conflict-related event
28This data can be found at http://centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/observatorio/
bases-de-datos/.
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only exists for 1995), municipal population (rural and urban), the proportion of people
with unsatisfied basic needs (used as a proxy for poverty), coca crops, internally displaced
people, and homicide and robbery rates. Sources for these controls are listed in the note
attached to Table I.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
To estimate the impact of religious competition on conflict-related violence, we use a
linear two-way (unit and time) fixed effects (FE) estimator. Our main specification models
a given outcome yi,t (e.g. probability of a conflict-related event) in municipality i and year
t as a function of the arrival of the first non-Catholic church:
yi,t = αi + βt +
−2∑
τ=−K
γτD
τ
i,t +
L∑
τ=0
γτD
τ
i,t + i,t (2)
where Dτi,t is an indicator for τ years from municipality i’s treatment (τ = 0 is the year of
treatment),29 αi and βt are municipality and year fixed effects, and i,t is the error term.
The coefficients of interest are γτ .
30 The main specifications also include department-year
fixed effects, municipality-specific linear trends, and municipality-year controls.31
The primary identifying assumption of this dynamic two-way fixed-effects model is that
changes in “control” municipalities (i.e. those that have not yet experienced the arrival of a
non-Catholic church, and those that already experienced it L periods ago) provide a valid
counterfactual for the changes that would have occurred in adopting municipalities if they
had never experienced the arrival of a non-Catholic church (i.e. there are no time-varying
unobserved effects). This assumption, which is fundamental to interpreting our estimates
as causal effects, may be invalid if, for example, the arrival of a non-Catholic church were
preceded (and explained) by an unobserved conflict-related event.
29Note that negative values of τ indicate the arrival of the first non-Catholic church |τ | years in the
future (so it represents the “lead” effect, which is represented by K), and positive values indicate its arrival
τ years in the past (i.e, the “lag,”, which is represented by L). Thus, in this dynamic specification we allow
the treatment to have distinct effects in the adoption year and in the years following adoption. Also note
that we do not include all possible relative time indicators in Eq. (2); this is due to multicolinearities,
as discussed by Laporte and Windmeijer (2005), Borusyak and Jaravel (2017) and Abraham and Sun
(2018). As for which relative time to exclude, we follow the common practice and normalized relative
to the period prior to treatment. In addition, in the main specifications we exclude 1995 to allow for
heterogenous effects that use variables only existent for that year. In addition, excluding 1995 helps us
to deal with the problem of non-Catholic churches established in a municipality before 1995 and that
potentially were the first to apply for legal status.
30In the robustness check section, we consider alternative specifications to Eq. (2). For example, we
consider specifications in which all possible lag and lead effects are not used, that the period τ = −1
is not excluded, that the treatment effects are heterogenous across municipalities, and that γτ does not
necessarily equal 0 for all τ < 0.
31In all specifications, we cluster the standard errors at the municipal level to control for potential serial
correlation over time. However, our results are robust to clustering at the department level. This is a
fairly strict test since the cross-sectional variation in our key variables is at the municipal level, and 405
municipalities in our final sample are grouped into 32 departments.
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The main specification also assumes that the treatment effects are homogenous. This
implies that the changes in the probability of conflict-related violence associated with the
establishment of a non-Catholic church is the same for all municipalities (in particular for
those treated at different times). If the homogeneous treatment effects assumption is not
satisfied, the estimates obtained using a dynamic two-way fixed effects model may not be
causally interpretable. Indeed, in some recent works on identification of treatment effects
using multiple time periods and staggered adoption (Abraham and Sun 2018; Callaway
and Sant’Anna 2018; de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille 2018; Goodman-Bacon 2018), in
settings where treatment timing varies (as in our case) or the treatment effect is expect to
be non-homogenous, the usual fixed-effect estimator might not recover the average treat-
ment effect. These works show that when treatment effects are heterogeneous across units,
estimation of parameters such as γτ in Eq. (2) recovers a weighted average of all possible
pairs of underlying difference-in-differences estimators, so the estimated parameters may
not be causally interpretable (see for instance Prop. 2 in Abraham and Sun 2018).
We examine the empirical validity of this assumption in a variety of ways. For example,
we explore the robustness of our findings by sometimes conditioning on a variety of possibly
confounding municipality-year variables. We also show that the presence of conflict-related
violence (and related factors) prior to the arrival of a non-Catholic church in a municipality
is not correlated with the church’s arrival. In addition, we explore robustness of our
estimations to heterogeneity across units by using Abraham and Sun (2018)’s estimator,
which is based on Goodman-Bacon 2018’s interaction-weighted estimator and relies on the
absence of anticipation. Finally and importantly, insofar as Abraham and Sun (2018)’s
estimator assumes a quasi-experimental setting (i.e. a difference-in-differences setting),
which may not correspond to our case, we follow Tchuente and Windmeijer (2019) and use
an alternative estimator which, besides being robust to cross-unit heterogeneity, allows us
to recover the average treatment effects.
5 Main Results
5.1 Baseline results
Figure III examines the effect of the first non-Catholic church in a municipality on the
probability of an attack by a guerrilla group. It shows a statistically significant increase.
Table II shows estimates for the same effect using various versions of Eq. (2).32 The
specification in column (5) corresponds to that used in Figure III, and includes municipality
and year fixed effects, department-year fixed effects, municipality-specific linear trends and
a series of municipality-year controls. The estimates confirm those from Figure III: the
probability of an attack by a guerrilla group is 9 percentage points higher in the year that
the first non-Catholic church is established. This increase corresponds to 0.2 of a standard
deviation, a large effect. Columns (1) to (4) in Table II consider alternative specifications:
32To simplify the exposition, Table II only includes estimates for τ = −3,−2, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Table
A2 shows the estimates for all lags and leads. Table A4 shows that the estimates in Table II (or A2) are
robust to using fewer lags and leads.
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without municipality-specific linear trends (columns (1) and (2)), without the controls for
past attacks by the armed groups (columns (1), (3) and (4)), without any controls (columns
(1) and (3)) and with all controls (columns (2) and (5)). The results in columns (1) to (4)
are consistent with those in column (5).33
Table III examines whether the introduction of religious competition also affects the
chances of observing an attack by other armed groups: the paramilitaries (columns (3) and
(4)) and the Colombian national army (columns (5) and (6)). All columns in Table III use
the same specifications of columns (3) and (5) in Table II, whose estimates are repeated
in columns (1) and (2) of Table III for the sake of comparison. Results in columns (3)
and (4) show a positive, relatively large, but statistically insignificant effect. Results in
columns (5) and (6) show no effect.34
The results in Table III confirms that the effect of religious competition is specific to
attacks by non-state armed groups. Moreover, these results are consistent with left-wing
guerrilla groups being more negatively affected by the presence of non-Catholic churches,
thereby having more incentives to react violently. As previously argued, this is consistent
with anecdotal evidence that identifies the left-wing guerrilla groups, and in particular
the FARC, as more responsible for the murders of religious leaders. In addition, as we
will discuss below, the fact that the effect for the probability of a killing by a right-wing
paramilitary group is positive and relatively large suggests that an explanation based on
ideological differences alone is unlikey.35
33As previously mentioned, even though all specifications in Table II, we cluster the standard errors at
the municipal level, our results are robust to clustering at the department level. This is shown in Table
A3 in the Appendix.
34We explore robustness to using the NCHM data set described in footnote 4.1. As previously mentioned,
this data set focuses on the assassination of civilians, and includes information on the intensity of the
killings and the perpetrators. However, and importantly, this information is very imprecise (e.g. for more
than 40% of the observations, the most likely perpetrator is unknown). Column (1) in Panel A in Table
A5 in the Appendix (A.4) presents estimates for the probability of a killing by an armed group that are
consistent with the results in Table II. Columns (2) and (3) focus on killings for which the most likely
perpetrator is a guerrilla group (column (2)) or a paramilitary group (column (3)). The estimates are still
positive, but statistically insignificant. The estimates for the probability of a killing by a guerrilla group
are not statistically significant, which could be seen as inconsistent with the results in Table II. However,
the high degree of imprecision in the information about the perpetrators may explain this: guerrilla and
paramilitary groups may be behind an important percentage of killings that the NCHM classifies as having
an unknown perpetrator. Consistent with this hypothesis, column (6) in Panel A in Table A5 shows a
significant effect for the probability of a killing by a guerrilla group or an unknown group, and column (7)
shows a smaller but statistical significant effect for those killings by a paramilitary group or an unknown
group. Finally, Panel B in Table A5 presents estimates for the killing rates (per 10,000 inhabitants).
No estimate is statistically significant, which suggests that the effect found in Table II is specific to the
extensive margin (the occurrence of an event of conflict-related violence).
35As mentioned in footnote 34, the results in column (7) in Panel A in Table A5 support this claim:
using an alternative data set, we find a positive and statistically significant effect for the probability of a
killing by a paramilitary group or an unknown group.
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5.2 Evidence on our proposed mechanism
As argued in Section 3, although the introduction of a competing church could affect
conflict-related violence in multiple ways, our proposed mechanism focuses on the possibil-
ity that competition for church adherents affects those would-be adherents’ collaboration
with non-state armed groups, particularly guerrilla groups.
Empirically assessing the extent to which an increase in religious competition affects
civilians’ willingness to collaborate with a non-state armed group is complex. We examine
the plausibility of our hypothesis by looking at one of its most immediate implications:
that the effect of religious competition on guerrilla violence should be larger in those places
where the guerrilla groups expect to be more affected by a decrease in their recruitment
and member retention capacities. To identify these places, we use as proxies the existence
of cases of forced recruitment, the percentage of young and middle-age adults, and the
presence of coca crops, all in the past. We hypothesize that in municipalities with forced
recruitment, with a larger share of young and middle-age adults or with coca crops, the
armed groups value collaboration with the population more, thus they see the establish-
ment for the first time of a non-Catholic church as more threatening and they react more
violently to prevent any drop in collaboration there.
Figure IV and Table IV show estimates of the same specifications used in column (3)
and/or (5) of Table II, but distinguish between those municipalities with and without past
cases of forced recruitment (Panel A),36 and between those municipalities with an average
percentage of population aged 10-29 above and below the median in the past (Panel B).37
We find that the effect of religious competition on the probability of an attack by a
guerrilla group is substantially larger in those municipalities with at least one case of forced
recruitment, and with an above-median share of young and middle-age adults. Figure V
and Table V repeat the same exercise but distinguish between those municipalities with
and without coca crops in the past.38 We find that the effect of religious competition on the
probability of an attack by a guerrilla group is substantially larger in those municipalities
with a historical presence of coca crops. Importantly, these additional results support the
theory that our main results are due to guerrilla groups’ expectations that more religious
competition leads to less collaboration.
An immediate question that follows from our hypothesis and the results in Tables IV
and V is how religious competition might affect the capacity of guerrillas to recruit new
members and to deter old members from deserting. The theory in Section 3, as well as
the argument in the previous paragraphs, predict an ambiguous effect. The establishment
of the first non-Catholic church in a municipality could imply a decrease in forced recruit-
36The data on forced recruitment is from the National Centre for Historical Memory (NCHM) and is
available from 1988 onwards, so we look at forced recruitment from 1988 to 1995.
37The data on the percentage of population aged 10-29 is from the National Administrative Department
of Statistics (DANE) and is available from 1988 onward, so we compute the average of this percentage
over 1988 to 1995.
38The data on coca crops is from the Center for Studies of Economic Development (CEDE). It is available
regionally since 1999, and for the whole country since 2000. Therefore, we only use data for 1999 and
2000.
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ment and an increase in desertion, because greater competition between the churches for
adherents includes convincing potential guerrilla recruits and actual guerrilla members to
abandon the group for the church. However, if the violent responses by the guerrilla groups
are effective, the effect should be very small, non-existent or may even be reversed.
Figure VI and Table VI show estimates of Eq. (2) using as a dependent variable a
dummy equal to one if there is at least one case of forced recruitment (Panel A) or a
desertion from a guerrilla group (Panel B), in a municipality-year.39 They show no effect
in the year the first non-Catholic church is established, an increase in the probability of a
desertion in the year that follows this establishment, and an increase in the probability of
observing a forced recruitment in the third year after the increase in religious competition.40
The results in Figure VI and Table VI are consistent with the effect predicted by the
theory. First, in the year of the establishment of the first non-Catholic church, when
we found that guerrilla groups react more violently, we do not observe any statistically
significant effect on the probability of a forced recruitment or desertion.41 Second, in the
year that follows the increase in religious competition, we observe an increase in the chances
of desertion, and no effect on the chances of forced recruitment.42 Finally, in the third year
after the increase in religious competition, we observe an increase in forced recruitment.43
6 Other mechanisms and additional evidence
The most intuitive alternative explanation for the results in the last section is that the
increase in violence by non-state armed groups is only due to ideological differences between
the armed groups, particularly guerrilla groups, and non-Catholic churches. According to
this hypothesis, the ideology of a typical non-Catholic church — which, as argued in Section
2, includes a defense of the economic status quo — is incompatible with the guerrillas’
Marxist ideology, and this incompatibility would be sufficient to explain the increase in
conflict-related violence.
Empirically assessing the extent to which the ideology of the guerrilla groups is incom-
patible with that of a non-Catholic church is difficult. A first argument against this first
39The desertion data is from the CEDE and is available only since 2001. Since the sample for our main
specification includes 1996 to 2000, in the specifications used the Panel B in Figure VI and Table VI, we
restrict the sample to 2001 to 2009.
40We focus on the years immediately following the establishment of the first non-Catholic church because
the effect of the treatment is expected to be more direct.
41This result is consistent with guerrilla groups being effective in maintaining their recruiting capacity
and in discouraging desertion.
42This is consistent with the presence of an additional (and perhaps unexpected) cost to the guerrilla
groups associated with their violent reaction to the increase in religion competition: it may encourage
desertion because it may weaken the guerrilla groups internally. One important factor that may favor
desertion is the ideological deterioration of the guerrilla groups caused by their involvement in drug
trafficking (see Verdad Abierta, 2010). Since the guerrillas’ violent reaction to the increase in religious
competition is greater in municipalities with coca crops, in these municipalities violent actions primarily
seeking to protect this income source may encourage desertion.
43This result is consistent with guerrilla groups increasing forced recruitment to replace deserters. For
anecdotal evidence, see El tiempo (2009).
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alternative explanation was given in the last section: the effect of the first non-Catholic
church on the probability of an attack by a right-wing paramilitary group is positive, rela-
tively large, and, using an alternative dataset, statistically significant. A second argument
is based on the idea that if ideological differences alone mattered, the intensity of religious
competition should not be particularly relevant to the results in Table II. In Figure VII
and Table VII, we examine whether this is the case, by presenting estimates for municipal-
ities where the historical level of conservatism (as measured by the Conservative party’s
vote share in mayoral elections before 1995) is above (or below) the median (Panel A),44
and where the historical presence of the Catholic church (as measured by the number of
Catholic churches in 1995 per 100,000 inhabitants) is above (or below) the median (Panel
B).45 We hypothesize that in municipalities that have not been very conservative, or that
haven’t had many Catholic churches, the first non-Catholic church has a greater chance of
getting new adherents, so the religious competition there should be more intense. Consis-
tent with our hypothesis, we find in Figure VII and Table VII that the effect of religious
competition on the probability of an attack by a guerrilla group is substantially greater in
municipalities that had not been very conservative nor strongly Catholic. In addition, for
strongly conservative or Catholic municipalities, the effect is not only smaller but statisti-
cally insignificant. We interpret these results as providing additional evidence that intense
religious competition — rather than only ideological differences — is crucial to the story.
A second alternative explanation is that the increase in violence by guerrilla groups
is due to a specific interest of the guerrilla groups in preventing newly established non-
Catholic groups from gaining political representation. Although this explanation is com-
patible with that proposed in Section 3, anecdotal evidence does not seem to support it:
between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, guerrilla groups (in particular the FARC) typically
tried to sabotage local elections instead of sponsoring specific left-wing candidates (see
GMH, 2013b, pp. 257-267).46
We empirically assess the plausibility of this explanation by presenting estimates for
municipalities where the historical support for left-wing parties (as measured by vote share
for left-wing parties in mayoral elections before 1998) is above (or below) the median.47 We
hypothesize that if political influence is the only factor that matters, the effect of religious
competition on guerrilla violence should be larger in those places where guerrilla groups
have traditionally had more political representation (or at least in places traditionally
governed by parties ideologically close to the guerrilla groups). Table VIII presents the
estimates, showing no difference in the effect of religious competition on the probability
44This includes data for the 1988, 1990, 1992 and 1994 mayoral elections.
45As mentioned before, data on the number of Catholic churches only exists for 1995.
46However, this strategy seemed to change in the mid-2000s, when guerrilla groups moderated their
attacks on the electoral process, reverting to social mobilization and political campaigning (see GMH,
2013b, p. 275). One example is the support given by the FARC to the most important left-wing party in
Colombia during in the mid-2000s (see Clarin, 2007).
47We include the 1997 elections in the pre-sample period — and focus on the 1998 to 2009 period —
because before 1997, there were very few municipalities where left-wing parties obtained more votes than
the median; this changed significantly in the 1997 elections. As for the identification of left-wing political
parties, we mainly follow Fergusson et al. (2017). Table A6 in the Appendix (A.4) provides details about
these parties and the classification criteria.
17
of an attack by a guerrilla group in municipalities with above-median and below-median
historical support for left-wing parties.48
A third alternative explanation is related to the possible effect that the introduction
of religious competition might have on the ‘moral’ behavior of individuals in the mu-
nicipalities, which while not directly related to their collaboration with guerrilla groups,
nonetheless may affect the guerrillas’ incentives to use violence. Specifically, consider a
scenario in which the introduction of religious competition makes individuals more pre-
disposed to committing crimes — such as murders or robberies — because their spiritual
standards are diluted (as in Eswaran 2011). An increase in crime, by exhausting police
resources and weakening local institutions, could lower the cost of violence to the guerril-
las, leading them to use more of it. Table IX examines the plausibility of this hypothesis
by looking at the effect of religious competition on the rates of homicides and robberies.
Importantly, no estimate in Table IX is statistically different from zero, which provides
evidence against this explanation.
7 Additional Robustness Checks
As mentioned in Section 4, our empirical strategy relies on two main identifying as-
sumptions: absence of time-varying selection on unobservables, and treatment effect ho-
mogeneity.49 In this section, we discuss these assumptions and two alternative estimation
procedures that relax them.
Regarding the absence of selection on unobservables, we do the following. First, we
show that our results are robust to the inclusion of a variety of possibly key confounding
municipality-year variables. They include the log of total population, the proportion of
the population living in rural areas, the proportion of the population with unsatisfied
basic needs (used as a proxy for poverty), the homicide rate, and the prior presence of a
non-state armed group. The results in columns (2) and (5) of Table II, which come from
a specification that included all these controls, show that the estimates are virtually the
same as those obtained without controlling for these variables (columns (1), (3) and (4) in
Table II). In addition, the specifications in Table II not only include municipality and year
fixed effects, but also department-year fixed effects. Finally, and importantly, the results in
columns (3), (4) and (5) of Table II include municipality-specific linear trends. These linear
48Even though the results in Table VIII are not consistent with the hypothesis that political influence
alone matters, it is still possible that political representation matters for both guerrilla groups and non-
Catholic churches. In Table A7 in the Appendix (A.4), we look at the effect of the establishment of the
first non-Catholic church on outcomes in the next election. We do not find any statistically significant
effect for Liberals, Conservatives or left-wing parties. Thus, electoral outcomes (at least for these parties)
do not seem to be affected by the increase in political competition, or the subsequent reaction by guerrilla
groups. Note that we cannot identify whether the increase in political competition does not directly affect
electoral outcomes, or if it could have affected them if the guerrilla groups had not reacted violently to
the increase in religious competition. Any of these scenarios is consistent with the explanation proposed
in Section 3, and would only add to the basic mechanism.
49An additional assumption is what Abraham and Sun (2018) call “no anticipatory behavior,” which
essentially requires potential outcomes before the treatment to be equal to the baseline outcome.
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trends allow for the possibility that conflict-related violence in different municipalities was
on different trajectories from the beginning.
Second, we show that the presence of conflict-related violence (and related factors) prior
to the establishment of the first non-Catholic church in a municipality is not correlated
with that church’s arrival. Column (1) in Table X presents the correlation between the
establishment of the first non-Catholic church in a municipality and an attack by an
armed group in the previous year, using a specification that includes municipality, year,
department-year fixed effects and municipality-specific linear trends. Column (2) regresses
the same outcome on lags of total population, the proportion of the population living in
rural areas, unsatisfied basic needs and the homicide rate. Column (3) combines regressors
from columns (1) and (2) and adds electoral outcomes for the last mayoral election (which
reduces the sample). Column (4) includes lags of the rate of internally displaced persons
(outflows and inflows), of the occurrence of at least one desertion from a guerrilla group
and an event of forced recruitment. Column (5) combines the regressors from columns
(1) and (4). Column (6) adds the interaction of the internal coffee price with coffee
intensity (which, following Dube and Vargas, 2013, we interpret as a proxy for income
shocks).50 Finally, column (7) combines the regressors from all the previous columns.
Importantly, we find that in all specifications, factors closely related to present attacks
(e.g. conflict-related violence in the previous year, internally displaced persons, guerrilla
desertion, income shocks) are statistically insignificant.
In Table X, we focus on specifications where the sample coincides most closely with
our main results. The estimates show that the only variable that is correlated (slightly
negatively) with the establishment of the first non-Catholic church is total population.
We interpret these results as evidence that conditional on the controls (which includes an
important group of fixed effects), the arrival of a non-Catholic church in a municipality
is unlikely to be related to any unobserved time-varying factors specific to a municipality
that are also closely correlated with guerrilla violence.51
50Dube and Vargas (2013) use this interaction to estimate the effect of commodity price shocks on
armed conflict in Colombian municipalities. They find that coffee price shocks are negatively related
to conflict. By noting that agricultural commodities are labour intensive, and by showing that coffee
price shocks also affect labour market outcomes, Dube and Vargas argue in favor of an opportunity cost
mechanism: commodity prices affect conflict because they alter the opportunity cost of armed recruitment.
Since through a similar channel coffee price shocks can also affect religious adherence to newly established
non-Catholic churches, the inclusion of this variable is important for identification.
51The results in Table X do not shed any light on why a non-Catholic church establishes in a municipality.
In addition, they do not seem consistent with what other scholars have mentioned as the main reason for
the success of non-Catholic churches in Colombia: the urban transition and the need for hope that results
from this phenomenon (see Section 2). Since it is reasonable to expect that the establishment of the first
non-Catholic church in a municipality is not random, in the Appendix (A.3) we propose an explanation
that is consistent with the results in Table X, and provide evidence in its favor. Specifically, we hypothesize
that the urban transition is still relevant, but only in places where, for historical reasons, other channels
for social (or political) action are not available (see Table A1 in Appendix A.3). These additional results
allow us to argue that in our main specification, we account for the main factors that plausibly explain
the success of non-Catholic churches in Colombia: a historical characteristic, captured by municipality
fixed effects and whose evolution may be captured by the municipality-specific trends, and the proportion
of the population living in rural areas, the level of poverty and attacks by guerrillas, which we include as
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Concerning the no anticipatory behavior assumption, in addition to the results in Table
X (which are consistent with non-anticipation), we show that there is no “effect” of being
τ years prior to the establishment of the first non-Catholic church. In our specification,
this means that the estimates for γτ with τ < 0 are equal to zero. Table II shows the
estimates for γτ with τ = −3 and τ = −2 and Table A2 in the Appendix (A.4) includes
the estimates for all leads. None of the estimates for τ < 0 is statistically significant.
Regarding the treatment effect homogeneity assumption, we implement an interaction-
weighted estimator whose identification relies on assumptions specific to difference-in-
differences frameworks. As previously mentioned, we use the specification proposed by
Goodman-Bacon (2018) and implemented by Abraham and Sun (2018). Panel A in Figure
VIII and columns (3) and (4) in Table XI show the estimates (which we call “AS”).52 For
the sake of comparison, columns (1) and (2) in Table XI repeat the estimates for the two-
way fixed effects specification described in Eq. (2), i.e. those from column (1) in Table II.
Columns (3) and (4) (and the pattern in Panel A in Figure VIII) show estimates that are
consistent with those in columns (1) and (2).
Finally and importantly, we relax both the homogeneity across municipalities assump-
tion and the “no anticipatory behavior” assumption by proposing an alternative specifica-
tion from Tchuente and Windmeijer (2019). In the Appendix (A.2), we summarize this
specification, which focuses on the delayed and anticipated average treatment effects (as in
Laporte and Windmeijer 2005) rather than on the “cohort-specific average treatment” (as
in Abraham and Sun 2018).53 Panel B in Figure VIII and columns (5) and (6) in Table XI
controls.
52The Abraham and Sun (2018) estimator essentially uses an interacted specification saturated with
relative time and cohort indicators, and takes appropriate weighted averages of the resulting estimates.
Specifically, we first estimate
yi,t = αi + βt +
2009∑
e=1996
∑
τ 6=−1
δe,τ (1{Ei = e} ·Dτi,t) + νi,t (3)
where e denotes the year of the initial treatment, 1{Ei = e} is a dummy variable equal to one for the
set of units treated at e, Dτi,t is an indicator for being τ years relative to i’s treatment, and αi and βt
are municipality and year fixed effects. Second, we estimate a set of appropriate weights that are the
sample share of each cohort e across cohorts that are observed τ periods after the establishment of the
first non-Catholic church. Third and finally, we take weighted averages of the estimates from (3), δˆe,τ ,
to form average treatment effect estimates with the weight estimates previously obtained. Like Abraham
and Sun (2018), we exclude the first cohort from the sample (i.e. those municipalities treated in 1996)
because for this cohort we do not observe it when untreated. Unlike Abraham and Sun (2018), we do not
need to drop the last period because there are municipalities that are not treated in the last period (but
that will be treated in a future period). In addition, our sample contains a year in which no municipality
is treated (2000), which we need to exclude. As in (2), we include department-year fixed effects, but do
not include municipality-specific linear trends nor any other control variable.
53The Tchuente and Windmeijer (2019) estimator essentially uses a split of the sample in two groups,
one for influenced periods (denoted by L), and other for which Dτi,t = 0. For the first group, we estimate
yi,t − y¯Li =
∑
τ∈{−K,...,L}
θτ,LDτi,t + υi,t (4)
where y¯Li = 1/(T − L¯i)
∑T
t=1 yi,t(1−Li,t), Li,t = 1{t ∈ {−K, ..., ei, ...L}} is an indicator of the fact that
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show the estimates (which we call “TW”). The TW estimates (and the pattern in Panel
B in Figure VIII) are also consistent with those in columns (1) and (2). These results, as
well as those obtained using the AS estimator, provide a crucial robustness check for the
estimates presented in Section 5.
8 Conclusion
This study examines how religious competition affects armed conflict. It focuses on
Colombia, a deeply religious country that has suffered one of the world’s longest-running
domestic conflicts, and that in the last few decades also experienced an intense increase
in religious competition. Two-way fixed effects estimates show that religious competition
substantially increases the probability of an attack by a non-state armed group, particularly
a guerrilla group. Further analysis suggests that the increase in attacks by guerrilla groups
is associated with guerrillas’ expectation that their membership will drop because of more
competition for religious adherents.
Several opportunities exist for future research. One could examine the effect of religious
competition on political participation. It would also be interesting to examine whether
other organizations and local institutions are affected. Finally, there are the questions
about how religious groups react to the increase in violence, and whether the armed conflict
influences the evolution of individuals’ religious identities.
period t is in the neighborhood of the event, and L¯i =
∑T
t=1 Li,t. For the second group, we estimate
yi,t − y¯Li = θτ,DLi,t + ϑi,t (5)
Finally, we compute γˆτFEL = θˆ
τ,L + θˆτ,D.
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Figures and Tables
Figure II: Change in proportion of Colombian municipalities with at least one non-Catholic
church (nCc)
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Source: Colombian Ministry of the Interior (Public Registry of Religious Organizations)
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics
Municipalities where
first non-Catholic
church was established
All municipalities in 1996-2017
Obs. Mean St. dev. Obs. Mean St. dev.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attack by guerrillas (prob.) 15167 0.328 0.469 5544 0.388 0.487
Attack by paramilitaries (prob.) 15167 0.131 0.337 5544 0.202 0.401
Attack by national army (prob.) 15167 0.332 0.471 5544 0.419 0.493
Desertion from guerrillas (prob.) 13999 0.125 0.330 5126 0.170 0.375
Forced recruitment (prob.) 15167 0.143 0.350 5544 0.183 0.387
Internally displaced outflows (rate) 15104 1872.373 5265.243 5530 1469.365 3177.840
Internally displaced inflows (rate) 15104 955.563 2863.002 5530 1040.923 1924.354
Coca crops (prob.) 11976 0.164 0.371 4365 0.142 0.349
Homicides (rate) 14707 53.251 71.543 5426 54.351 55.267
Robberies (rate) 7673 71.578 115.509 2793 111.295 140.376
Catholic churches (in 1995) 15167 2.053 10.594 5544 3.773 17.370
Total population 15104 38251.906 228658.028 5530 85286.752 373112.886
Proportion of rural population 15104 4.361 12.812 5530 1.473 2.244
Unsatisfied basic needs 15104 50.411 20.574 5544 45.104 21.336
Proportion of young population 15104 0.366 0.028 5530 0.370 0.025
Notes: The sample in all columns is restricted to data from 1996 to 2009. The sample in columns
(1)-(3) includes all municipalities. The sample in columns (4)-(6) is limited to municipalities where a
non-Catholic church obtained legal status for the first time between 1996 and 2017. Data on attacks
by guerrillas, paramilitaries and the national army comes from the Conflict Analysis Resource Center
(CERAC). Data on desertion from a guerrilla group, internally displaced people, coca crops and crime
(homicides and robberies) is from the Center for Studies of Economic Development (CEDE). Data on
population and proportion of people with unsatisfied basic needs (used as a proxy for poverty) are from
the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE).
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Figure III: Effect of first non-Catholic church on prob. of attack by guerrillas
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This figure shows the two-way fixed effects estimates from Eq. (2), in a
specification that includes municipality and year fixed effects, department ×
year fixed effects, municipality-specific linear trends and the following (lagged)
covariates: log of total population, proportion of the population living in rural
areas, proportion with unsatisfied basic needs (used as a proxy for poverty),
homicide rate and attacks by guerrillas, paramilitaries and the Colombian
national army. Vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.
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Table II: Effect of first non-Catholic church on prob. of attack by guerrillas
Dep. variable = 1 if an
attack by a guerrilla group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attack at t-3 0.008 0.007 0.003 -0.005 -0.007
(0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
Attack at t-2 -0.016 -0.017 -0.015 -0.013 -0.011
(0.035) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Attack at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Attack at t 0.073∗ 0.081∗ 0.083∗ 0.088∗ 0.090∗∗
(0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045)
Attack at t+1 0.027 0.025 0.039 0.033 0.038
(0.040) (0.041) (0.046) (0.047) (0.048)
Attack at t+2 0.062 0.050 0.074 0.054 0.053
(0.049) (0.050) (0.057) (0.060) (0.060)
Attack at t+3 0.023 0.017 0.037 0.017 0.022
(0.051) (0.053) (0.064) (0.067) (0.068)
Attack at t+4 0.070 0.076 0.089 0.082 0.083
(0.055) (0.056) (0.073) (0.076) (0.076)
Attack at t+5 0.114∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.130∗ 0.130∗ 0.134∗
(0.056) (0.058) (0.075) (0.078) (0.079)
R-sq 0.552 0.555 0.599 0.604 0.606
Observations 5474 5319 5474 5319 5319
Municipality-specific trends No No Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Controls for past attacks No Yes No No Yes
Notes: All columns report the two-way fixed effects estimates from Eq. (2) when the
respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. All models include 13 lags
and 13 leads, normalized to the period prior to treatment, and include municipality
and year fixed effects and department × year fixed effects. The models with baseline
controls (columns (2), (4) and (5)) include the following (lagged) covariates: log of
total population, proportion of the population living in a rural area, proportion of the
population with unsatisfied basic needs and the homicide rate. The models with controls
for past attacks (columns (2) and (5)) add the presence of attacks (lagged) by guerrillas,
paramilitaries and the national army. Samples for regression models use data from 1996
to 2009. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by municipality. * denotes
statistically significant estimates at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes
significant at 1%.
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Table III: Effect of first non-Catholic church on prob. of attack by perpetrator
Dep. variable = 1 if an attack by
Guerrilla Paramilitaries Ntl. Army
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attack at t-3 0.003 -0.007 0.046 0.054 -0.031 -0.040
(0.040) (0.041) (0.035) (0.036) (0.044) (0.047)
Attack at t-2 -0.015 -0.011 0.017 0.020 0.000 -0.009
(0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.035) (0.043) (0.042)
Attack at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Attack at t 0.083∗ 0.090∗∗ 0.041 0.028 0.011 0.007
(0.044) (0.045) (0.037) (0.037) (0.046) (0.046)
Attack at t+1 0.039 0.038 0.070 0.062 0.030 0.030
(0.046) (0.048) (0.044) (0.046) (0.050) (0.051)
Attack at t+2 0.074 0.053 0.077 0.073 -0.083 -0.075
(0.057) (0.060) (0.052) (0.054) (0.061) (0.065)
Attack at t+3 0.037 0.022 0.091 0.089 -0.049 -0.069
(0.064) (0.068) (0.064) (0.067) (0.062) (0.064)
Attack at t+4 0.089 0.083 0.124 0.128 -0.059 -0.079
(0.073) (0.076) (0.083) (0.087) (0.076) (0.076)
Attack at t+5 0.130∗ 0.134∗ 0.079 0.077 -0.099 -0.103
(0.075) (0.079) (0.089) (0.093) (0.080) (0.081)
R-sq 0.599 0.606 0.461 0.469 0.549 0.555
Observations 5474 5319 5474 5319 5474 5319
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: All columns report the two-way fixed effects estimates from Eq. (2) when the
respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. All models include 13 lags and
13 leads, normalized to the period prior to treatment, and include municipality and year
fixed effects, department × year fixed effects and municipality-specific linear trends. The
models with controls (columns (2), (4) and (6)) include the following (lagged) covariates:
log of total population, proportion of the population living in a rural area, proportion with
unsatisfied basic needs (used as a proxy for poverty), homicide rate and attacks by guerrillas,
paramilitaries and the national army. Samples for regression models include data from 1996
to 2009. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by municipality. * denotes
statistically significant estimates at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes
significant at 1%.
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Figure IV: Effect of first non-Catholic church on prob. of attack by a guerrilla group, by
occurrence of a forced recruitment (Panel A) and by percentage of young and middle-age
adults (Panel B), before 1996
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These figures show the two-way fixed effects estimates from Eq. (2), in a spec-
ification that includes municipality and year fixed effects, department × year
fixed effects, municipality-specific linear trends and the following (lagged) co-
variates: log of total population, proportion of the population living in a rural
area, proportion with unsatisfied basic needs (used as a proxy for poverty),
homicide rate and attacks by guerrillas, paramilitaries and the national army.
Vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.
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Table IV: Effect of first non-Catholic church on prob. of attack by a guerrilla group, by
occurrence of a forced recruitment (Panel A) and by percentage of young and middle-age
adults (Panel B), before 1996
Dep. variable = 1 if an attack by guerrillas in mun.:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: with at least one case of without any case of
forced recruitment bf 1996 forced recruitment bf 1996
Attack at t-3 -0.154 -0.176 0.014 0.004
(0.137) (0.142) (0.043) (0.044)
Attack at t-2 0.002 -0.043 -0.021 -0.020
(0.116) (0.111) (0.042) (0.043)
Attack at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Attack at t 0.172 0.187∗ 0.061 0.068
(0.107) (0.095) (0.050) (0.051)
Attack at t+1 0.186 0.204 -0.004 -0.006
(0.135) (0.128) (0.052) (0.056)
Attack at t+2 0.141 0.173 0.041 0.012
(0.161) (0.161) (0.072) (0.078)
Attack at t+3 -0.134 -0.117 -0.001 -0.024
(0.211) (0.213) (0.083) (0.093)
Attack at t+4 0.193 0.215 0.033 0.015
(0.173) (0.174) (0.099) (0.109)
Attack at t+5 0.224 0.248 0.062 0.057
(0.160) (0.162) (0.111) (0.126)
R-sq 0.761 0.769 0.576 0.584
Observations 673 656 4704 4566
Panel B: above-median share of young below-median share of young
and middle-age adults bf 1996 and middle-age adults bf 1996
Attack at t-3 0.063 0.054 -0.064 -0.073
(0.063) (0.064) (0.054) (0.057)
Attack at t-2 -0.020 -0.005 -0.012 -0.017
(0.062) (0.062) (0.051) (0.053)
Attack at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Attack at t 0.112∗ 0.131∗∗ 0.023 0.032
(0.063) (0.065) (0.063) (0.063)
Attack at t+1 0.045 0.077 0.005 -0.005
(0.072) (0.075) (0.066) (0.071)
Attack at t+2 0.100 0.101 0.033 -0.008
(0.102) (0.108) (0.076) (0.080)
Attack at t+3 0.051 0.056 0.003 -0.027
(0.093) (0.103) (0.100) (0.107)
Attack at t+4 0.136 0.140 0.030 0.019
(0.098) (0.101) (0.108) (0.117)
Attack at t+5 0.211∗ 0.235∗ 0.047 0.048
(0.116) (0.128) (0.112) (0.118)
R-sq 0.623 0.631 0.598 0.606
Observations 2716 2607 2632 2578
Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: All columns report the estimates from Eq. (2) when the respective characteristic is used as
the dependent variable. All models include 13 lags and 13 leads, normalized relative to the period
prior to treatment, and include municipality and year fixed effects, department × year fixed effects
and municipality-specific linear trends. The models with controls (columns (2) and (4)) include the
following (lagged) covariates: log of total population, proportion of the population living in a rural area,
proportion with unsatisfied basic needs (used as a proxy for poverty), homicide rate and attacks by
guerrillas, paramilitaries and the national army. Samples for regression models include data from 1996
to 2009. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by municipality. * denotes statistically
significant estimates at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%.
28
Figure V: Effect of first non-Catholic church on prob. of attack by a guerrilla group, by
presence of coca crops before 2001
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These figures show the two-way fixed effects estimates from Eq. (2), in a spec-
ification that includes municipality and year fixed effects, department × year
fixed effects, municipality-specific linear trends and the following (lagged) co-
variates: log of total population, proportion of the population living in a rural
area, proportion with unsatisfied basic needs (used as a proxy for poverty),
homicide rate and attacks by guerrillas, paramilitaries and the Colombian
national army. Vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.
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Table V: Effect of first non-Catholic church on prob. of attack by a guerrilla group, by
presence of coca crops in 2000
Dep. variable = 1 if an attack by a
guerrilla group in municipalities
with presence of without presence of
coca crops before 2001 coca crops before 2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Attack at t-3 0.006 -0.010 -0.010 -0.027
(0.125) (0.121) (0.047) (0.050)
Attack at t-2 0.017 0.011 -0.014 -0.005
(0.142) (0.131) (0.047) (0.046)
Attack at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Attack at t 0.262 0.275∗ 0.013 0.002
(0.167) (0.157) (0.065) (0.067)
Attack at t+1 0.204∗ 0.241∗ -0.007 -0.019
(0.117) (0.123) (0.073) (0.076)
Attack at t+2 0.089 0.126 -0.047 -0.084
(0.222) (0.220) (0.112) (0.119)
Attack at t+3 0.113 0.113 -0.008 -0.052
(0.224) (0.251) (0.127) (0.142)
Attack at t+4 0.162 0.145 0.167 0.117
(0.242) (0.262) (0.135) (0.146)
Attack at t+5 -0.063 -0.025 0.186∗ 0.167
(0.267) (0.291) (0.111) (0.120)
R-sq 0.739 0.762 0.643 0.656
Observations 567 565 2949 2888
Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: All columns report the two-way fixed effects estimates from Eq. (2)
when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. All models
include 9 lags and 9 leads, normalized relative to the period prior to treatment,
and include municipality and year fixed effects, department × year fixed effects
and municipality-specific linear trends. The models with controls (columns (2)
and (4)) include the following (lagged) covariates: log of total population, pro-
portion of the population living in a rural area, proportion with unsatisfied
basic needs (used as a proxy for poverty), homicide rate and attacks by guer-
rillas, paramilitaries and the Colombian national army. Samples for regression
models include data from 2000 to 2009. Robust standard errors (in parenthe-
ses) are clustered by municipality. * denotes statistically significant estimates
at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%.
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Figure VI: Effect of first non-Catholic church on prob. of forced recruitment (Panel A)
and of desertion (Panel B)
(a) Panel A
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(b) Panel B
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These figures show the two-way fixed effects estimates from Eq. (2), in a spec-
ification that includes municipality and year fixed effects, department × year
fixed effects, municipality-specific linear trends and the following (lagged) co-
variates: log of total population, proportion of the population living in a rural
area, proportion with unsatisfied basic needs (used as a proxy for poverty),
homicide rate and attacks by guerrillas, paramilitaries and the national army.
Vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.
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Table VI: Effect of first non-Catholic church on prob. of forced recruitment (Panel A) and
of desertion (Panel B)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Dep. variable = 1 if a forced recruitment
Forced recruitment at t-3 -0.020 -0.020 -0.017 -0.017
(0.024) (0.024) (0.030) (0.030)
Forced recruitment at t-2 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017
(0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.029)
Forced recruitment at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Forced recruitment at t -0.049∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.027 -0.027
(0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027)
Forced recruitment at t+1 -0.022 -0.022 -0.003 -0.003
(0.029) (0.029) (0.036) (0.036)
Forced recruitment at t+2 -0.005 -0.005 0.018 0.018
(0.032) (0.032) (0.039) (0.039)
Forced recruitment at t+3 0.033 0.033 0.061 0.061
(0.034) (0.034) (0.038) (0.038)
Forced recruitment at t+4 0.026 0.026 0.056 0.056
(0.042) (0.042) (0.052) (0.052)
Forced recruitment at t+5 0.082∗ 0.082∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.109∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.055) (0.055)
R-sq 0.481 0.481 0.531 0.531
Observations 5715 5715 5715 5715
Panel B: Dep. variable = 1 if a desertion
Desertion at t-3 -0.044 -0.044 -0.026 -0.019
(0.036) (0.036) (0.065) (0.066)
Desertion at t-2 0.035 0.032 0.053 0.057
(0.045) (0.045) (0.066) (0.068)
Desertion at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Desertion at t 0.016 0.019 0.079 0.090
(0.053) (0.054) (0.069) (0.071)
Desertion at t+1 0.061 0.069 0.171∗∗ 0.177∗∗
(0.058) (0.060) (0.080) (0.080)
Desertion at t+2 -0.063 -0.061 0.101 0.102
(0.063) (0.064) (0.096) (0.100)
Desertion at t+3 -0.044 -0.039 0.162 0.167
(0.075) (0.076) (0.130) (0.136)
Desertion at t+4 -0.153∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗ 0.058 0.065
(0.056) (0.057) (0.112) (0.117)
Desertion at t+5 -0.101∗∗ -0.085∗ 0.088 0.092
(0.048) (0.050) (0.098) (0.102)
R-sq 0.551 0.553 0.618 0.619
Observations 3135 3074 3135 3074
Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: All columns report the two-way fixed effects estimates from Eq. (2) when the respective
characteristic is used as the dependent variable. All models include 13 lags and 13 leads,
normalized relative to the period prior to treatment, and include municipality and year fixed
effects, department × year fixed effects and municipality-specific linear trends. The models with
controls (columns (2) and (4)) include the following (lagged) covariates: log of total population,
proportion of the population living in a rural area, proportion with unsatisfied basic needs (used
as a proxy for poverty), homicide rate and attacks by guerrillas, paramilitaries and the national
army. Samples for regression models include data from 1996 to 2009. Robust standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered by municipality. * denotes statistically significant estimates at
10%, ** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%.32
Figure VII: Effect of first non-Catholic church on prob. of attack by a guerrilla group, by
level of conservatism (Panel A) and number of Catholic churches (Panel B), before 1996
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These figures show the two-way fixed effects estimates from Eq. (2), in a spec-
ification that includes municipality and year fixed effects, department × year
fixed effects, municipality-specific linear trends and the following (lagged) co-
variates: log of total population, proportion of the population living in a rural
area, proportion with unsatisfied basic needs (used as a proxy for poverty),
homicide rate and attacks by guerrillas, paramilitaries and the national army.
Vertical lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.
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Table VII: Effect of first non-Catholic church on prob. of attack by a guerrilla group, by
Conservative vote share (Panel A) and Catholic churches per capita (Panel B), before 1996
Dep. variable = 1 if an attack by guerrillas in mun.:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: above-median vote share below-median vote share
for Conservative party bf 1996 for Conservative party bf 1996
Attack at t-3 0.089 0.072 -0.042 -0.056
(0.070) (0.072) (0.051) (0.052)
Attack at t-2 -0.014 -0.003 -0.042 -0.048
(0.070) (0.070) (0.050) (0.053)
Attack at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Attack at t 0.061 0.058 0.091 0.106∗
(0.067) (0.067) (0.060) (0.063)
Attack at t+1 -0.021 -0.028 0.098∗ 0.114∗
(0.077) (0.076) (0.056) (0.061)
Attack at t+2 0.012 -0.010 0.143∗ 0.128
(0.087) (0.088) (0.078) (0.081)
Attack at t+3 -0.029 -0.054 0.098 0.107
(0.102) (0.101) (0.084) (0.093)
Attack at t+4 0.006 -0.016 0.180 0.206∗
(0.103) (0.101) (0.117) (0.124)
Attack at t+5 0.106 0.083 0.179∗ 0.220∗∗
(0.104) (0.102) (0.108) (0.111)
R-sq 0.652 0.661 0.604 0.617
Observations 2415 2388 2982 2881
Panel B: above-median number of per below-median number of per
capita Catholic churches in 1995 capita Catholic churches in 1995
Attack at t-3 0.058 0.031 -0.057 -0.058
(0.053) (0.056) (0.060) (0.063)
Attack at t-2 0.029 0.034 -0.052 -0.055
(0.056) (0.056) (0.054) (0.055)
Attack at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Attack at t -0.033 -0.041 0.167∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.053) (0.066) (0.068)
Attack at t+1 -0.028 -0.045 0.121 0.122
(0.051) (0.054) (0.077) (0.081)
Attack at t+2 0.042 0.002 0.113 0.101
(0.076) (0.077) (0.091) (0.096)
Attack at t+3 -0.023 -0.046 0.110 0.091
(0.095) (0.100) (0.098) (0.101)
Attack at t+4 0.021 0.006 0.202∗ 0.192
(0.099) (0.101) (0.113) (0.118)
Attack at t+5 -0.013 -0.026 0.284∗∗ 0.290∗∗
(0.099) (0.100) (0.117) (0.120)
R-sq 0.601 0.609 0.632 0.639
Observations 2758 2629 2646 2605
Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: All columns report the estimates from Eq. (2) when the respective characteristic is used as the
dependent variable. All models include 13 lags and 13 leads, normalized relative to the period prior to treat-
ment, and include municipality and year fixed effects, department × year fixed effects and municipality-
specific linear trends. The models with controls (columns (2) and (4)) include the following (lagged)
covariates: log of total population, proportion of the population living in a rural area, proportion with
unsatisfied basic needs (used as a proxy for poverty), homicide rate and attacks by guerrillas, paramilitaries
and the national army. Samples for regression models include data from 1996 to 2009. Robust standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered by municipality. * denotes statistically significant estimates at 10%,
** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%.
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Table VIII: Effect of first non-Catholic church on prob. of attack by a guerrilla group, by
left-wing vote share before 1997
Dep. variable = 1 if an attack by guerrillas in mun.:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
above-median vote share below-median vote share
for a left-wing party bf 1998 for a left-wing party bf 1998
Attack at t-3 0.023 -0.003 0.017 0.022
(0.085) (0.087) (0.050) (0.052)
Attack at t-2 0.014 0.010 -0.005 0.008
(0.090) (0.092) (0.050) (0.051)
Attack at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Attack at t 0.038 0.014 0.031 0.041
(0.134) (0.140) (0.059) (0.062)
Attack at t+1 0.106 0.123 -0.084 -0.076
(0.101) (0.114) (0.067) (0.072)
Attack at t+2 0.123 0.139 -0.066 -0.083
(0.116) (0.127) (0.076) (0.081)
Attack at t+3 0.114 0.141 -0.122 -0.129
(0.116) (0.123) (0.079) (0.085)
Attack at t+4 0.028 0.066 0.002 -0.006
(0.138) (0.153) (0.077) (0.079)
Attack at t+5 0.203∗ 0.268∗∗ -0.016 -0.012
(0.120) (0.131) (0.079) (0.082)
R-sq 0.698 0.707 0.623 0.630
Observations 1184 1156 3432 3340
Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: All columns report the estimates from Eq. (2) when the respective characteristic is used as the
dependent variable. All models include 11 lags and 11 leads, normalized relative to the period prior to treat-
ment, and include municipality and year fixed effects, department × year fixed effects and municipality-
specific linear trends. The models with controls (columns (2) and (4)) include the following (lagged)
covariates: log of total population, proportion of the population living in a rural area, proportion with
unsatisfied basic needs (used as a proxy for poverty), homicide rate and attacks by guerrillas, paramilitaries
and the national army. Samples for regression models include data from 1998 to 2009. Robust standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered by municipality. * denotes statistically significant estimates at 10%,
** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%.
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Table IX: Effect of first non-Catholic church on homicide and robbery rates
Dep. variable:
Homicide rate Robbery rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Attack at t-3 -1.306 -1.432 -6.887 -7.064
(4.678) (4.670) (9.011) (9.148)
Attack at t-2 0.395 0.026 -9.140 -9.495
(3.839) (3.851) (8.014) (7.970)
Attack at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Attack at t 1.510 1.314 -10.327 -9.985
(3.748) (3.681) (14.892) (15.005)
Attack at t+1 0.981 0.614 0.767 1.947
(4.355) (4.256) (20.917) (20.971)
Attack at t+2 -0.893 -0.847 13.510 13.196
(5.049) (5.006) (29.852) (29.916)
Attack at t+3 -0.944 -1.100 18.506 20.216
(5.399) (5.297) (43.415) (43.419)
Attack at t+4 -2.715 -2.550 11.254 14.657
(6.132) (6.038) (58.902) (58.994)
Attack at t+5 -7.793 -7.987 132.375 137.765
(7.187) (7.109) (88.075) (88.476)
R-sq 0.706 0.707 0.809 0.809
Observations 5373 5366 2163 2163
Controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: All columns report the two-way fixed effects estimates from Eq.
(2) when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable.
All models are normalized relative to the period prior to treatment, and
include municipality and year fixed effects, department × year fixed ef-
fects and municipality-specific linear trends. The models in columns (1)
and (2) include 13 lags and 13 leads, and contain data from 1996 to
2009. The models in columns (3) and (4) include 6 lags and 6 leads,
and data from 2003 to 2009. The models with controls (columns (2) and
(4)) include the following (lagged) covariates: log of total population,
proportion of the population living in a rural area, proportion with un-
satisfied basic needs (used as a proxy for poverty), homicide rate and
attacks by guerrillas, paramilitaries and the Colombian national army.
Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by municipality. *
denotes statistically significant estimates at 10%, ** denotes significant
at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%.
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Table X: Determinants of first non-Catholic church
Dep. variable = 1 when first
non-Catholic church is established
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Attack by guerrilla (prob.) at t-1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.007
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Attack by paramilitaries (prob.) at t-1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Attack by national army (prob.) at t-1 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Internally displaced pop. (outflow, rate) at t-1 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Internally displaced pop. (inflow, rate) at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Desertion from the guerrilla (prob.) at t-1 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Forced recruitment (prob.) at t-1 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Log of total population at t-1 -0.196∗ -0.194∗ -0.200∗ -0.200∗ -0.174 -0.166
(0.111) (0.114) (0.119) (0.119) (0.120) (0.122)
Prop. of rural population at t-1 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.014
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
Homicide (rate) at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unsatisfied Basic Needs at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Vote share for the Liberal party at t-1 0.021 0.008
(0.016) (0.016)
Vote share for the Conservative party at t-1 0.006 0.013
(0.020) (0.020)
Vote share for leftwing parties at t-1 0.059 0.055
(0.048) (0.049)
Coffee int. x log coffee price at t-1 0.010 0.008
(0.010) (0.010)
R-sq 0.257 0.258 0.261 0.258 0.258 0.238 0.239
Observations 5463 5319 5252 5313 5313 4755 4700
Notes: All models include municipality, year and department × year fixed effects, as well as municipality-
specific linear trends. Samples for regression models include data from 1996 to 2009. Robust standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered by municipality. * denotes statistically significant estimates at 10%, ** denotes
significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%.
37
Figure VIII: Effect of first non-Catholic church on prob. of guerrilla attack; alternative
estimators
Panel A: AS estimator
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Panel B: TW estimator
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The figure in panel A shows Abraham and Sun (2018)’s interaction-weighted estimator (AS). The figure in panel B
shows Tchuente and Windmeijer (2019)’s estimator (TW). Both AS and TW estimators are implemented following the
procedures described in the Appendix (A.2).
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Table XI: Effect of first non-Catholic church on prob. of attack by a guerrilla group;
alternative estimators
Dep. variable = 1 if an attack by a guerrilla group
FE AS TW
Attack at t-5
Attack at t-4
Attack at t-3
Attack at t-2
Attack at t-1
Attack at t
Attack at t+1
Attack at t+2
Attack at t+3
Attack at t+4
Attack at t+5
estimate SE
(1) (2)
-0.046 0.034
-0.049 0.032
0.008 0.035
-0.016 0.035
0.000 .
0.073 0.041
0.027 0.040
0.062 0.049
0.023 0.051
0.070 0.055
0.114 0.056
estimate SE
(3) (4)
-0.002 0.059
-0.030 0.065
0.000 0.000
0.088 0.052
0.057 0.047
0.067 0.049
0.043 0.059
estimate SE
(5) (6)
-0.024 0.031
-0.052 0.030
-0.020 0.031
-0.055 0.031
0.005 0.034
0.105 0.039
0.088 0.040
0.120 0.041
0.090 0.043
0.183 0.045
0.243 0.046
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) report the two-way fixed effects difference-in-differences estimates
from Eq. (2) and repeat the estimates from column (1) in Table II. Columns (3) and (4) re-
port Abraham and Sun (2018)’s interaction-weighted estimator (AS). Columns (5) and (6) report
Tchuente and Windmeijer (2019)’s estimator (TW). Both AS and TW estimators are implemented
following the procedures described in Section 7, where L = K = 5 for the TW estimator and
L = K = 13 for the AS estimator.
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A Appendix
A.1 Model
In this section, we develop the theoretical model for which the results are described in Section
3. As previously mentioned, we use a Hotelling-like framework. First, we consider the scenario in
which the religious market is served by a monopoly A with strictness a. Note that an individual
located to the right of a always prefers (and chooses) the church. Also note that there is an
indifferent individual i such that any individual located to the left of i prefers (and chooses) the
armed group, F , to A, and any individual located to the right of i prefers (and chooses) A to F .
For an individual located at j ∈ (0, a) who is indifferent between joining F and A, we have that
1− (a− i) = 1− (i− 0), or, equivalently, i = a/2.
The church chooses its level of strictness, a, to maximize the sum of the contributions of its
members, i.e., it solves
max
a
∫ a
a/2
[1− (a− x)]dx+
∫ 1
a
[1− (x− a)]dx (6)
Differentiating the last expression with respect to a, we have the first-order condition
−
∫ a
a/2
dx+ [1− (a− a)]− [1− (a− a/2)](1/2) +
∫ 1
a
dx+ [1− (1− a)]0− [1− (a− a)] = 0 (7)
which, rearranging, and solving for a, is equivalent to am = 2/5, where m represents the
monopoly scenario.54 Importantly, note that the proportion of people belonging to F in
this scenario, which we denote by fm, is
fm =
1
5
(8)
Now we consider the scenario in which there are two churches, A and B, with strict-
nesses of a and b, respectively and where, without loss of generality, b ≥ a. First, note that
for an individual j located at j ∈ (a, b) who is indifferent between joining a church located
at a and a church located at b, we have that 1 − (j − a) = 1 − (b − j) or, equivalently,
j = (a+ b)/2.
As for an individual j located at j ∈ (0, a), who is indifferent between joining F and
A, we know that i = a/2. Importantly, note that if a/2 ≤ 1/5, those individuals in
(a/2, 1/5) decide to abandon F to join A. We assume that A pays a cost associated with
its recruitment efforts. Specifically, we assume that A loses a fraction β of the contributions
by the individuals who decide to abandon F to join A. We examine the conditions under
which a/2 ≤ 1/5. In this case, A must solve
max
a
V A = (1− β)
∫ 1/5
a/2
[1− (a− x)]dx+
∫ a
1/5
[1− (a− x)]dx+
∫ (a+b)/2
a
[1− (x− a)]dx (9)
54It is easy to see that am corresponds to a maximum, since differentiating with respect to a against
the first-order condition, we have that (1/2)(2− 1/2)− 1 < 0.
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the first-order condition of which is
−(1− β)
∫ 1/5
a/2
dx− (1− β)[1− (a− a/2)](1
2
)
−
∫ a
1/5
dx+ 1 +
∫ (a+b)/2
a
dx+ [1− ((a+ b)/2− a)](1
2
)− 1 = 0
(10)
Rearranging, and solving for a, we have that A’s best response function is
a(b) =
b
(5− 3(1− β)) +
12− 14(1− β)
5(5− 3(1− β)) (11)
As for church B, it solves the problem
max
b
V B =
∫ b
(a+b)/2
[1− (b− x)]dx+
∫ 1
b
[1− (x− b)]dx (12)
where the first-order condition is
− b/2 + a/2− (1/2) + b/4− a/4 + 1− b = 0 (13)
which rearranging and solving for b yields B’s best response function
b(a) =
(a+ 2)
5
(14)
Combining (11) and (14), and solving for a, we have that ac = 14β/(9 + 15β), where c
represents the Nash solution competition scenario. Importantly, note that in this case the
proportion of people belonging to F , which we denote by f c, is ac/2, or, equivalently,
f c =
7β
9 + 15β
(15)
Finally, we compare fm in (8) and f c in (15). Note that if f c < fm, a marketplace for
religion decreases the proportion of the population joining the armed group F . From (8)
and (15), we have that f c ≤ fm implies that
7β
9 + 15β
≤ 1
5
(16)
which, solving for β, is equivalent to55
β ≤ 9
20
(17)
Let ∆f(β) = fm − f c be the proportion of individuals abandoning F to join A. We know
that ∆f(β) ≥ 0 when (17) is satisfied. From (8) and (15), we have that
∆f(β) =
9− 20β
5(9 + 15β)
(18)
where it is easy to see that d∆f(β)/dβ < 0. Thus, an increase in β decreases the proportion
of people willing to abandon F to join A.
55Note that when (17) is satisfied, ac/2 ≤ 1/5 ≤ ac.
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A.2 Identification
In this section, we propose an alternative specification (to Goodman-Bacon (2018)’s) from
Tchuente and Windmeijer (2019), whose estimates are described in Section 7.
Consider an outcome yi,t (e.g. the probability of a conflict-related event) in municipality i and
year t, and model it as a function of Di,t, where Di,t is an indicator of the state of municipality
i and year t. There are L + K + 2 states. Assume that for any time period, a municipality
can be in only one of the L + K + 2 states. In this scenario, the potential outcomes are yi,t(τ)
with τ ∈ −K, ...,−1, e, 1, ..., L, and yi,t(0), where yi,t(0) corresponds to the outcome out of the
influence area of the treatment. Assume that the treatment status is an absorption state; in the
context of this paper, this assumption is plausibly satisfied as we focus on the establishment of
the first non-Catholic church in a municipality.
Let us define now the following quantities.
Treatment effect at time of event:
γie = yi,t(e)− yi,t(0) (19)
τ period anticipated treatment effect:
γiτ− = yi,t(−τ)− yi,t(0) (20)
τ period delayed treatment effect:
γiτ+ = yi,t(τ)− yi,t(0) (21)
Note that the observed outcome can be written as
yi,t =
∑
s∈{−K,...,L,e}
1{s = Si,t}yi,t(s) (22)
Assume that the outcome out of the influence area of the treatment can be written
yi,t(0) = αi + αt + αXi,t + εi,t (23)
and that
yi,t = αi + αt + αXi,t +
∑
τ∈{−K,...,L}
γiτD
τ
i,t + εi,t (24)
where Dτi,t is a dummy variable indicating if individual i is in state τ at period t. Defining
γi = (γi−K , ..., γiL), Si,t = (D−Ki,t , ..., D
L
i,t) and γ = E(γi), it is easy to see that the model in (24)
is equivalent to
yi,t = αi + αt +
∑
τ∈{−K,...,L}
γτD
τ
i,t + vi,t (25)
with vi,t = (γi − γ)S′i,t + εi,t and where, to simplify the exposition, we have removed Xi,t.
We are interested in the estimation of γ. As recent works on identification of dynamic
treatment effects have shown (e.g. Abraham and Sun 2019; de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille
2018, and Goodman-Bacon 2018), in presence of heterogenous treatment effects, the estimation
of (25) does not give the average treatment effect.
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In a recent work, Tchuente and Windmeijer (2019) notice that the variable Si,t is a real
random vector with special properties. For instance, if Si,t = (1, 0...0), then Sit+1 = (0, 1, 0...0).
Motivated by this observation, Tchuente and Windmeijer (2019) propose an estimator that can
solve the problem of the failure of the identification in estimating (25). In the rest of this section,
we will briefly describe this estimator, which as previously mentioned, we call TW.
Let Li,t = 1{t ∈ {−K, ..., ei, ...L}, for individual i} be an indicator of the fact that period
t is in the neighborhood of the event, and define L¯i =
∑T
t=1 Li,t as the number of influenced
periods. Note that the average outcome in a period far from the event, which we will use as a
benchmark, can be written as
y¯Li =
1
T − L¯i
T∑
t=1
yi,t(1− Li,t) (26)
Note that the following quantity identifies the average treatment effect
γτFEL = E[yi,t − y¯Li |Dτi,t = 1, Li,t = 1]− E[yi,t − y¯Li |Dτi,t = 0, Li,t = 0] (27)
Since γτFEL in Eq. (27) cannot be estimated using a linear panel model, we propose a transfor-
mation that uses a split sample strategy. First, note that
γτFEL = E[yi,t − y¯Li |Dτi,t = 1, Li,t = 1]− E[yi,t − y¯Li |Dτi,t = 0, Li,t = 0]
= E[yi,t − y¯Li |Dτi,t = 1, Li,t = 1]− E[yi,t − y¯Li |Dτi,t = 0, Li,t = 1]
+ E[yi,t − y¯Li |Dτi,t = 0, Li,t = 1]− E[yi,t − y¯Li |Dτi,t = 0, Li,t = 0]
From the last expression, define θτ,L = E[yi,t−y¯Li |Dτi,t = 1, Li,t = 1]−E[yi,t−y¯Li |Dτi,t = 0, Li,t = 1]
and θτ,D = E[yi,t − y¯Li |Dτi,t = 0, Li,t = 1]− E[yi,t − y¯Li |Dτi,t = 0, Li,t = 0], with which
γτFEL = θ
τ,L + θτ,D (28)
We can split the sample in two groups. First, we create a sub-sample for which Li,t = 1, and
estimate the following linear panel data model:
yi,t − y¯Li =
∑
τ∈{−K,...,L}
θτ,LDτi,t + υi,t (29)
Second, we consider the sub-sample for which Dτi,t = 0, and estimate the model
yi,t − y¯Li = θτ,DLi,t + ϑi,t (30)
Finally, we compute γˆτFEL = θˆ
τ,L + θˆτ,D, where θˆτ,D and θˆτ,L are obtained from (29) and (30),
respectively.
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A.3 Determinants of first non-Catholic church
As mentioned in footnote 51, the results in Table X do not shed any light on why a non-
Catholic church establishes in a municipality. In this section we propose an explanation that
is consistent with the results in Table X, and provide evidence in its favor. Specifically, we
hypothesize that the urban transition is still relevant, but only in places where, for historical
reasons, other channels for social (or political) action are not available.
To examine the plausibility of this hypothesis, we exploit a key characteristic of the Colombian
party system: that it was dominated by two very old political parties (Liberal and Conservative),
which maintained a duopoly of power at all levels of government for more than a century, and
that only in the 2000s started to lose out to other contenders. In this context, we propose that
during the period we focus on, i) in places where the two traditional parties had been strong, there
were fewer alternatives for political action, and ii) in places where the two traditional parties had
been weak, there were more alternatives for political action. We claim that in the first group
of municipalities, non-Catholic churches were expected to be more successful in exploiting new
needs for hope, and in the second group of municipalities, non-Catholic churches were expected to
use other strategies (such as focussing on other more traditional challenges that may also result
in needs for hope, e.g. poverty).
Table A1 below examines the plausibility of this hypothesis by using a specification similar
to that in column (5) of Table X (which we repeat for the sake of comparison in column (1)),
but now distinguish between those municipalities where the historical level of support for the
two traditional parties (as measured by their vote share in mayoral elections before 1995) is
either above the median (column (2)) or below the median (column (3)). Consistent with our
hypothesis, the estimates for column (2) show that in municipalities with high historical support
for the two traditional parties, a lower proportion of the population living in rural areas makes the
establishment of the first non-Catholic church more likely. In addition, the estimates in column
(3) show that in municipalities with a low historical support for the two traditional parties, the
level of poverty (and rurality) is positively correlated with the establishment of the first non-
Catholic church. Finally, note that column (3) also shows a negative correlation between the
occurrence of a previous guerrilla attack and the establishment of the first non-Catholic church;
an explanation may be that in municipalities with a low historical support for the two traditional
parties, a new religious organization may also compete with other new (political) organizations,
and this may discourage the religious leaders from establishing roots there, since they may expect
a stronger reaction from the guerrillas that were already present in the municipality.
The results in Table A1 allow us to argue that in our main specification, we account for the
main factors that plausibly explain the success of non-Catholic churches in Colombia: a historical
characteristic, captured by municipality fixed effects and whose evolution may be captured by
the municipality-specific trends, and the proportion of the population living in rural areas, the
level of poverty and attacks by guerrillas, which we include as controls.
44
Table A1: Determinants of first non-Catholic church (by historical vote for Liberal and
Conservative parties (i.e. traditional parties)
Dep. variable = 1 when first
non-Catholic church is established in
Municipalities Municipalities
with historically with historically
Any high support for low support for
municipality traditional parties traditional parties
(1) (2) (3)
Attack by guerrilla (prob.) at t-1 -0.002 0.013 -0.020
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
Attack by paramilitaries (prob.) at t-1 -0.003 -0.015 0.012
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Attack by national army (prob.) at t-1 0.001 -0.006 0.013
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Internally displaced pop. (outflow, rate) at t-1 0.000 0.000∗∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Internally displaced pop. (inflow, rate) at t-1 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Desertion from the guerrilla (prob.) at t-1 -0.005 0.010 -0.016
(0.008) (0.013) (0.011)
Forced recruitment (prob.) at t-1 0.003 -0.000 0.008
(0.009) (0.014) (0.012)
Log of total population at t-1 -0.200∗ 0.008 -0.394∗∗
(0.119) (0.171) (0.161)
Prop. of rural population at t-1 0.013 -0.106∗ 0.062∗∗
(0.026) (0.054) (0.030)
Unsatisfied Basic Needs at t-1 0.000 -0.000 0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Homicide (rate) at t-1 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R-sq 0.258 0.333 0.273
Observations 5313 2677 2537
Notes: All models include municipality, year and department × year fixed effects, as well as municipality-
specific linear trends. Samples for regression models include data from 1996 to 2009. Robust standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered by municipality. * denotes statistically significant estimates at 10%,
** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%.
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A.4 Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Geographical distribution of non-Catholic churches in 2017
At least one non-Catholic church
Yes
No
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Table A2: Effect of first non-Catholic church on prob. of a guerrilla attack
Dep. variable = 1 if an attack by a guerrilla group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attack at t-13 -0.051∗ -0.054∗ -0.056∗ -0.058∗ -0.056∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Attack at t-12 -0.020 -0.014 -0.027 -0.022 -0.024
(0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Attack at t-11 -0.009 -0.000 -0.016 -0.008 -0.005
(0.029) (0.029) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037)
Attack at t-10 -0.015 -0.010 -0.023 -0.016 -0.012
(0.028) (0.029) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
Attack at t-9 -0.016 -0.015 -0.025 -0.025 -0.022
(0.030) (0.031) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042)
Attack at t-8 -0.011 -0.007 -0.020 -0.020 -0.016
(0.029) (0.029) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040)
Attack at t-7 -0.009 -0.013 -0.021 -0.026 -0.023
(0.030) (0.030) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Attack at t-6 -0.008 -0.007 -0.013 -0.016 -0.014
(0.030) (0.030) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040)
Attack at t-5 -0.046 -0.042 -0.048 -0.054 -0.051
(0.034) (0.034) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044)
Attack at t-4 -0.049 -0.051 -0.058 -0.063 -0.063
(0.032) (0.033) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041)
Attack at t-3 0.008 0.007 0.003 -0.005 -0.007
(0.035) (0.035) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
Attack at t-2 -0.016 -0.017 -0.015 -0.013 -0.011
(0.035) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Attack at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Attack at t 0.073∗ 0.081∗ 0.083∗ 0.088∗ 0.090∗∗
(0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045)
Attack at t+1 0.027 0.025 0.039 0.033 0.038
(0.040) (0.041) (0.046) (0.047) (0.048)
Attack at t+2 0.062 0.050 0.074 0.054 0.053
(0.049) (0.050) (0.057) (0.060) (0.060)
Attack at t+3 0.023 0.017 0.037 0.017 0.022
(0.051) (0.053) (0.064) (0.067) (0.068)
Attack at t+4 0.070 0.076 0.089 0.082 0.083
(0.055) (0.056) (0.073) (0.076) (0.076)
Attack at t+5 0.114∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.130∗ 0.130∗ 0.134∗
(0.056) (0.058) (0.075) (0.078) (0.079)
Attack at t+6 0.026 0.027 0.037 0.019 0.028
(0.059) (0.060) (0.084) (0.088) (0.089)
Attack at t+7 0.061 0.061 0.061 0.037 0.035
(0.059) (0.060) (0.095) (0.099) (0.100)
Attack at t+8 0.173∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.171 0.148 0.147
(0.057) (0.059) (0.104) (0.109) (0.110)
Attack at t+9 0.150∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.151 0.118 0.128
(0.060) (0.062) (0.116) (0.122) (0.123)
Attack at t+10 0.023 0.019 0.019 -0.013 -0.009
(0.064) (0.065) (0.128) (0.134) (0.135)
Attack at t+11 0.018 0.016 0.021 -0.018 -0.024
(0.062) (0.063) (0.136) (0.141) (0.142)
Attack at t+12 0.046 0.042 0.046 0.003 -0.003
(0.065) (0.065) (0.140) (0.145) (0.146)
Attack at t+13 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.048 -0.058
(0.082) (0.084) (0.175) (0.182) (0.181)
R-sq 0.552 0.555 0.599 0.604 0.606
Observations 5474 5319 5474 5319 5319
Municipality-specific trends No No Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Controls for past attacks No Yes No No Yes
Notes: All columns report the two-way fixed effects difference-in-differences estimates from Eq. (2) when
the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. All models include 13 lags and 13 leads,
normalized relative to the period prior to treatment, and include municipality and year fixed effects and
department × year fixed effects. The models with baseline controls (columns (2), (4) and (5)) include
the following (lagged) covariates: log of total population, proportion of the population living in a rural
area, proportion with unsatisfied basic needs and homicide rate. The model with controls for past attacks
(columns (2) and (5)) adds the presence of attacks (lagged) by guerrillas, paramilitaries and the national
army. Samples for regression models include data from 1996 to 2009. Robust standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered by municipality. * denotes statistically significant estimates at 10%, ** denotes significant at
5% and *** denotes significant at 1%.
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Table A3: Effect of first non-Catholic church on prob. of attack by guerrillas: robustness
to clustering by department
Dep. variable = 1 if an
attack by a guerrilla group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Attack at t-3 0.008 0.007 0.003 -0.005 -0.007
(0.034) (0.035) (0.039) (0.042) (0.043)
Attack at t-2 -0.016 -0.017 -0.015 -0.013 -0.011
(0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Attack at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Attack at t 0.073∗ 0.081∗ 0.083∗ 0.088∗∗ 0.090∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042)
Attack at t+1 0.027 0.025 0.039 0.033 0.038
(0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.041) (0.041)
Attack at t+2 0.062 0.050 0.074 0.054 0.053
(0.047) (0.050) (0.054) (0.063) (0.063)
Attack at t+3 0.023 0.017 0.037 0.017 0.022
(0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.052) (0.053)
Attack at t+4 0.070 0.076 0.089 0.082 0.083
(0.049) (0.049) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067)
Attack at t+5 0.114∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.130 0.130 0.134
(0.064) (0.060) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086)
R-sq 0.552 0.555 0.599 0.604 0.606
Observations 5474 5319 5474 5319 5319
Municipality-specific trends No No Yes Yes Yes
Baseline controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Controls for past attacks No Yes No No Yes
Notes: All columns report the two-way fixed effects estimates from Eq. (2) when the
respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. All models include 13 lags
and 13 leads, normalized to the period prior to treatment, and include municipality
and year fixed effects and department × year fixed effects. The models with baseline
controls (columns (2), (4) and (5)) include the following (lagged) covariates: log of
total population, proportion of the population living in a rural area, proportion of the
population with unsatisfied basic needs and the homicide rate. The models with controls
for past attacks (columns (2) and (5)) add the presence of attacks (lagged) by guerrillas,
paramilitaries and the national army. Samples for regression models use data from 1996
to 2009. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by department. * denotes
statistically significant estimates at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes
significant at 1%.
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Table A4: Effect of first non-Catholic church on prob. of a guerrilla attack (fewer lags and
leads)
Dep. variable = 1 if an attack by a guerrilla group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L = K = 12 L = K = 11 L = K = 10 L = K = 9 L = K = 8
Attack at t-12 -0.000
(0.030)
Attack at t-11 0.020 0.020
(0.034) (0.030)
Attack at t-10 0.014 0.014 0.006
(0.035) (0.031) (0.027)
Attack at t-9 0.005 0.005 -0.003 -0.005
(0.037) (0.035) (0.032) (0.029)
Attack at t-8 0.010 0.010 0.002 -0.000 -0.002
(0.036) (0.034) (0.030) (0.028) (0.025)
Attack at t-7 0.003 0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.010
(0.037) (0.034) (0.031) (0.029) (0.026)
Attack at t-6 0.011 0.011 0.003 0.001 -0.004
(0.037) (0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.028)
Attack at t-5 -0.027 -0.028 -0.036 -0.039 -0.044
(0.041) (0.039) (0.037) (0.035) (0.033)
Attack at t-4 -0.041 -0.042 -0.049 -0.052 -0.056∗
(0.039) (0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.032)
Attack at t-3 0.012 0.010 0.004 0.002 -0.000
(0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.034)
Attack at t-2 0.004 0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.008
(0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034)
Attack at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Attack at t 0.099∗∗ 0.096∗∗ 0.094∗∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.075∗
(0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045)
Attack at t+1 0.051 0.046 0.045 0.043 0.024
(0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Attack at t+2 0.068 0.062 0.061 0.059 0.037
(0.055) (0.053) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
Attack at t+3 0.040 0.032 0.030 0.028 0.006
(0.059) (0.057) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054)
Attack at t+4 0.107∗ 0.096∗ 0.094∗ 0.092∗ 0.067
(0.060) (0.057) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054)
Attack at t+5 0.161∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗
(0.060) (0.055) (0.055) (0.053) (0.052)
Attack at t+6 0.058 0.044 0.042 0.039 0.009
(0.061) (0.051) (0.050) (0.048) (0.047)
Attack at t+7 0.070 0.054 0.053 0.049 0.017
(0.065) (0.053) (0.051) (0.046) (0.045)
Attack at t+8 0.184∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.051) (0.047) (0.043) (0.040)
Attack at t+9 0.166∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.052) (0.049) (0.045)
Attack at t+10 0.032 0.010 0.011
(0.074) (0.052) (0.045)
Attack at t+11 0.019 -0.005
(0.072) (0.049)
Attack at t+12 0.041
(0.075)
R-sq 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.605 0.604
Observations 5319 5319 5319 5319 5319
Notes: All columns report the two-way fixed effects difference-in-differences estimates from Eq. (2) when the
respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. The model in column (1) includes 12 lags and 12 leads
(i.e. L = K = 12), the model in column (2) L = K = 11, and so on. All models include municipality and year
fixed effects, department × year fixed effects, and municipality-specific trends. All models include the following
(lagged) covariates: log of total population, proportion of the population living in a rural area, proportion with
unsatisfied basic needs and homicide rate, the presence of attacks (lagged) by guerrillas, paramilitaries and the
Colombian national army. Samples for regression models include data from 1996 to 2009. Robust standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered by municipality. * denotes statistically significant estimates at 10%, ** denotes
significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%.
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Table A5: Effect of first non-Catholic church on killing by perpetrator (NCHM data)
Dep. variable: Very selective killing by
Guerrilla Paramilitary
Any group Guerrilla Paramilitary Ntl. army Unknown or unknown or unknown
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Killing probability
Attack at t-2 -0.016 -0.016 0.018 0.001 -0.033 -0.037 -0.012
(0.026) (0.021) (0.014) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Attack at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Attack at t 0.070∗∗∗ 0.022 0.010 -0.004 0.042 0.059∗∗ 0.047∗
(0.023) (0.019) (0.012) (0.014) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Attack at t+1 0.062∗∗∗ 0.040∗ 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.036 0.037
(0.024) (0.022) (0.014) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Attack at t+2 0.063∗∗ 0.042∗ 0.008 0.006 0.029 0.059∗∗ 0.042∗
(0.025) (0.022) (0.015) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Attack at t+3 0.059∗∗ 0.028 -0.020 0.019 0.061∗∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.051∗∗
(0.025) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024)
Attack at t+4 0.038 0.034 0.002 0.016 0.023 0.025 0.032
(0.025) (0.025) (0.017) (0.017) (0.026) (0.027) (0.025)
R-sq 0.716 0.568 0.774 0.432 0.649 0.668 0.702
Observations 8501 8501 8501 8501 8501 8501 8501
Panel B: Killing rate
Attack at t-2 2.363 -0.202 1.861∗ 0.175 0.582 0.380 2.443
(1.644) (0.261) (1.085) (0.253) (0.641) (0.756) (1.553)
Attack at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Attack at t 0.412 0.029 0.631 -0.075 -0.154 -0.125 0.476
(0.869) (0.248) (0.553) (0.155) (0.467) (0.562) (0.773)
Attack at t+1 -0.027 0.125 0.226 0.046 -0.424 -0.300 -0.198
(1.005) (0.279) (0.652) (0.152) (0.535) (0.653) (0.926)
Attack at t+2 -0.051 0.389 -0.085 0.002 -0.351 0.038 -0.436
(1.149) (0.256) (0.815) (0.169) (0.519) (0.619) (1.073)
Attack at t+3 -0.376 0.080 0.202 -0.007 -0.661 -0.580 -0.459
(1.500) (0.267) (1.198) (0.196) (0.552) (0.687) (1.432)
Attack at t+4 -1.934 -0.072 -0.834 -0.002 -1.037∗ -1.110 -1.871
(1.701) (0.279) (1.313) (0.186) (0.623) (0.758) (1.636)
R-sq 0.747 0.566 0.706 0.315 0.644 0.667 0.741
Observations 8501 8501 8501 8501 8501 8501 8501
Notes: All columns report the two-way fixed effects difference-in-differences estimates from Eq. (2)
when the respective characteristic is used as the dependent variable. All models include 16 lags and
16 leads, normalized relative to the period prior to treatment, and include municipality and year fixed
effects, department × year fixed effects, and municipality-specific linear trends and the following (lagged)
covariates: log of total population, proportion of the population living in a rural area, proportion
with unsatisfied basic needs (used as a proxy for poverty), homicide rate and killings by guerrillas,
paramilitaries and the Colombian national army. Samples for regression models include data from 1996
to 2017, and municipalities treated for the first time between 1996 and 2017. Robust standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered by municipality. * denotes statistically significant estimates at 10%, **
denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%.
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Table A6: Left-wing parties
Political Party
1 Union Patriotica 9 Frente Social y Politico
2 Polo Democratico Alternativo 10 Movimiento 19 de abril
3 Polo Democratico Independiente 11 Socialdemocrata Colombiano
4 Partido Comunista 12 Independiente Frente de Esperanza
5 Alianza Nacional Popular ANAPO 13 Movimiento Ciudadano
6 Alianza Democratica M19 14 Alternativa Democratica
7 MOIR 15 Unidad Democratica
8 Frente Social y Politico 16 Vamos Ipiales
Notes: The classification of left-wing parties follows (see Fergusson et al., 2017), and adds the Partido
Comunista and excludes the Autoridades Indigenas de Colombia, which may be described as an ethnic
party (see Laurent, 2010).
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Table A7: Effect of first non-Catholic church on election outcomes
Dep. variable = vote share in next election for
Liberal party Conservative party Leftwing party
(1) (2) (3)
vote share at t-3 -0.010 -0.010 -0.006
(0.021) (0.016) (0.008)
vote share at t-2 0.002 0.012 0.003
(0.016) (0.013) (0.006)
vote share at t-1 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.)
vote share at t -0.011 -0.003 0.006
(0.016) (0.011) (0.007)
vote share at t+1 -0.019 -0.006 0.021∗
(0.026) (0.017) (0.012)
vote share at t+2 -0.032 -0.027 0.009
(0.029) (0.022) (0.013)
vote share at t+3 -0.015 -0.030 0.012
(0.031) (0.023) (0.015)
vote share at t+4 0.009 -0.031 0.008
(0.032) (0.023) (0.014)
vote share at t+5 0.017 -0.026 0.010
(0.030) (0.024) (0.015)
R-sq 0.773 0.757 0.496
Observations 5278 5278 5278
Notes: All columns report the estimates from Eq. (2) when the respective characteristic
is used as the dependent variable. All models include 13 lags and 13 leads, normalized
relative to the period prior to treatment, and include municipality and year fixed effects,
department × year fixed effects and municipality-specific linear trends. The models with
controls (columns (2) and (4)) include the following (lagged) covariates: log of total popu-
lation, proportion of the population living in a rural area, proportion with unsatisfied basic
needs (used as a proxy for poverty), homicide rate and attacks by guerrillas, paramilitaries
and the national army. Samples for regression models include data from 1996 to 2009. Ro-
bust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by municipality. * denotes statistically
significant estimates at 10%, ** denotes significant at 5% and *** denotes significant at 1%.
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